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Abstract
We find that the probability of all-stock financed takeovers increases with measures of bidder
overvaluation. However, when we instrument the bidder’s pricing error using aggregate mutual
fund flows, the reverse happens: greater overvaluation reduces the all-stock financing propensity.
Since shocks to aggregate fund flows are exogenous to the payment method choice—while directly
impacting bidder pricing errors—this evidence strongly rejects the notion that all-stock financed
takeovers are “market driven”. Bidders paying with stock tend to be small, non-dividend paying
growth companies with low leverage, that recently made a seasoned equity offering. We also
show that all-stock financing is more likely in high-tech industries, when the target and bidder
operate in highly complementary industries are geographically close—factors that suggest the
target is relatively informed about true bidder value. Overall, the evidence does not suggest a
particular role for market mispricing in driving all-stock financed takeovers.
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“[The AOL TimeWarner deal] was done on terms that were insane...AOL stock was
ridiculously overvalued...[AOL’s CEO Steve Case] chose the moment, almost to the
day, when his stock was most valuable and then used it as currency.”
—Geoffrey Colvin, “Time Warner, Dont Blame Steve Case”, February 3, 2003, Fortune.
1 Introduction
The dot.com bubble burst only two months after the January 2000 AOL TimeWarner merger
agreement, causing a reduction of more than $100 million in the combined market value of AOL
TimeWarner. This merger has become a poster child for the notion that bidder firms may succeed
in converting overvalued shares into hard target assets before the overvaluation is corrected. We
present new and powerful empirical tests of this “opportunistic bidder financing” hypothesis by
studying the payment method choice in takeover bids. Understanding the likelihood of bidders
getting away with selling overpriced shares is important not only for parties to merger negotiations
but more generally for the debate over the efficiency of the market for corporate control. The
larger concern is that opportunities for selling overpriced bidder shares may result in the most
overvalued rather than the most efficient bidder winning the target—potentially distorting the
important disciplinary role of the takeover market.
Classical economic theory rules out pure bets on the relative mispricing of the bidder and target
shares (they are zero-sum games).1 However, classical theory does not rule out that opportunities
for selling overpriced shares may coexist alongside other (exogenous) sources of takeover gains.
That is, zero-sum games may be played out if they are financed by expected synergies. This notion
is embedded in many strategic takeover theories where rational bidder and target managers are
asymmetrically informed about true stock values, in the literature on optimal auction bidding, as
well as in recent theories where targets for various reasons tend to accept overpriced bidder stock
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004).2
The logical implication of this notion is that the initially high market-to-book ratio (M/B) of
AOL may have reflected market anticipation of takeover synergies and growth options based on AOL
1Rational economic agents will not “agree to disagree” and execute a zero-sum stock swap at a positive price
(Aumann, 1976; Milgrom and Stokey, 1982).
2Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) model synergistic takeovers where rational (Bayesian) target managers
are more likely to accept payment in overpriced bidder shares when market valuations are generally high. Shleifer and
Vishny (2003) model synergistic takeovers where target acceptance of overvalued shares is a consequence of agency
problems and market inefficiency.
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fundamentals as much as the type of market overvaluation that could have been recognized by AOL
insiders ex ante. The empirical challenge, therefore, is to distinguish market mispricing from the
value of anticipated takeover synergies and growth options in the data, given that both depend on
unobservable (latent) factors and may affect market valuations in the same direction. The methods
of estimating a benchmark model for the true bidder value, e.g. using the observed valuation ratios
of comparable non-merging firms (Fu, Lin, and Officer, 2013), or inferring counterfactual bidder
stand-alone values from failed bids (Savor, 2006), do not meet this challenge. What is needed is
an instrument for changes in market pricing that is exogenous to the latent bidder fundamental
characteristics driving the takeover decision.
We provide large-sample tests of the all-stock payment choice in takeovers based on such an
instrument. Our instrument exploits recent evidence that large trades by mutual fund investors cre-
ate economically and statistically significant price pressure in the form of temporary price changes
of stocks held by the funds (Coval and Stafford, 2007). This evidence has been exploited in takeover
settings that differ from ours. Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim
(2012) and Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) all examine how mutual fund trade-induced price pres-
sure affect the ex ante probability of a takeover. In contrast, we examine the determinants of
the all-stock payment choice, conditional on a bid. Also, Hau and Lai (2013) study the effect of
price pressure on corporate investment decisions. As shown by these studies as well as by our
evidence below, the various trade-based instruments used in this literature are generally successful
in identifying significant stock price effects in the data.
The use of mutual fund trade induced price pressure as an instrument is not without problems:
there is evidence suggesting that trades by some active institutional investors is based on pri-
vate information about acquiring firm fundamentals (Nain and Yao, 2013; Ben-David, Drake, and
Roulstone, 2013). To reduce the impact of such information-based fund trades on our instrument,
we follow Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) and scale the current period’s aggregate mutual
fund flow with last period’s fund portfolio weights. That is, our instrument assume that funds
experiencing significant in- or outflows at the time of the takeover bid simply scale their portfolio
investments up or down without changing their relative investment proportions in our bidder firms
from the previous period. This scaling, which is factually correct for the passively managed funds
in our data, substantially removes the possibility that the instrument is correlated with current-
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period private information about latent bidder characteristics. However, to be even more certain of
this, we also exclude sector-specific funds from our instrument as these are more likely to trade on
current-period valuable bidder information. Moreover, as pointed out by Edmans, Goldstein, and
Jiang (2012) outflows from sector funds are likely to be correlated with industry fundamentals.
We begin our empirical analysis by developing a cross-sectional “baseline” probit model for
the payment method choice. The baseline model captures equilibrium correlations between the
use of all-stock (relative to payment methods involving cash) and observable firm- and macro
characteristics in part suggested by the extant literature. This model shows that all-stock payers
tend to be relatively small, non-dividend-paying growth companies with high R&D activity and low
leverage. This is hardly surprising as these types of firms tend to have few pledgable assets necessary
to raise cash by issuing debt to pay for the takeover. Moreover, we find that all-stock takeovers
tend to cluster around industry-specific merger waves and in periods with high capital liquidity
(low credit market spreads).3 Our industry-based evidence expands extant findings that stock-
mergers are positively correlated with economy-wide merger activity (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and
Viswanathan, 2005). Also, it shows that the earlier finding of Harford (2005) that stock-financing of
partial-firm (divisional) acquisitions increases during industry merger waves also extends to merger
bids.
We then add measures of bidder valuation errors to our baseline probit model which the ex-
tant literature suggests may be correlated with market mispricing. The first follows Rhodes-Kropf,
Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) who decompose a firm’s M/B into a long-run valuation compo-
nent, an industry sector valuation error, and a firm-specific error, all of which are included in our
model. The second measure is the valuation discount used in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012),
which is constructed using a different industry valuation benchmark. The third measure is the ag-
gregate sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006). When including these candidate misvaluation
measures uninstrumented into our baseline probit model, we find that the likelihood of all-stock as
payment method is significantly related to the Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)
pricing error only. Our instrumental variable tests are therefore focused primarily on their firm-
specific valuation error.
3We follow Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang (2012) and construct industry-specific merger waves for each of the 49
Fama-French industries (FF49) by each year calculating the aggregate dollar volume of mergers scaled by the total
asset volume of all Compustat firms.
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This brings us to the paper’s main finding. Under the opportunistic financing hypothesis,
the likelihood of bidders using all-stock as payment method (relative to payments involving cash)
should be increasing in the instrumented firm-specific bidder valuation error. That is, at the
margin, a positive exogenous shock to the bidder stock price should make it more likely that the
bidder selects to pay for the target with all-stock. However, we find the opposite: fund flow
shocks that cause bidder stock to be overpriced (positive instrumented pricing error) significantly
reduces the probability of observing all-stock as payment method. This result, which survives a
number of robustness checks, represents to our knowledge the strongest rejection in the literature
of the hypothesis that the payment method in all-stock financed takeovers is driven by market
overvaluation of bidder shares.4
To further assess the relevance of our opportunistic financing hypothesis, we also perform the
more traditional analysis of bidder announcement-induced abnormal stock returns as well as a post-
announcement (long-run) performance. If rational market participants are concerned with bidder
adverse selection and overpricing, bidder announcement-period stock returns should be negative on
average (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Moreover, if the pricing error measure is correlated with true
market mispricing, the market reaction should be more negative the greater the ex ante pricing error.
This cross-sectional prediction has been tested by Dong, Hisrshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006)
in the context of market timing arguments, and by Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) in an
equilibrium setting where the bidder’s private information is fully revealed by the payment method
choice. Moreover, we estimate the performance of long-short portfolios (long in correctly priced
or undervalued bidders and short in overvalued bidders) over the three years following the merger
announcement. If all-stock bidders are temporarily overpriced, risk-adjusted portfolio performance
should be positive. Our regression results also fail to support these additional predictions of bidder
overvaluation.
To better understand the rejection of the opportunistic financing hypothesis and the economic
nature of the all-stock financing decision, we replace the industry fixed-effects in the baseline
model with industry- and geographic location factors. This produces some additional interesting
4The robustness checks involve eliminating mixed cash-stock bids (so the choice is between all-stock and all-cash
bids only), instrumenting other potential misvaluation variables, controlling for relative mispricing of bidders and
targets, separating positive from negative pricing errors, and splitting up the instrument into one based on aggregate
fund inflows and another based on aggregate fund outflows.
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insights. We show that the likelihood of observing all-stock financed takeovers is greater in high-tech
industries, when industry complementarity (the extent to which the industries of the bidder and
target share the same inputs and outputs) is high, and when the bidder and target are geographically
close. This evidence is important because none of these characteristics suggests a particular role
for misvaluation. On the contrary, targets that are geographically close and operating in highly
complementary industries are, if anything, more likely to be well informed about bidder fundamental
value and thus less likely to naively accept overpriced bidder shares. When we instrument the
firm-specific valuation error accounting for these additional industry variables, the main IV test
result remains unchanged: the instrumented error again receives a statistically significant negative
coefficient estimate, rejecting the opportunistic financing hypothesis.
Our rejection of the opportunistic financing hypothesis and our finding that industry character-
istics and geographic location are important drivers of the payment method choice give credence to
the classical notion that takeovers enhance economic efficiency. Thus, our results fit with the grow-
ing evidence that takeover synergies emanate from industry-specific productivity shocks (Mitchell
and Mulherin, 1996; Boon and Mulherin, 2000; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Harford, 2005), and
that takeovers lead to productivity gains (Maksimovic and Phillips, 1998; Maksimovic, Phillips,
and Prabhala, 2011; Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang, 2012; Makaew, 2012) and promote efficiency
along the supply chain (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010; Ahern and Harford, 2013).
We end the paper suggesting a potential capital structure channel for the significant effect
of the instrument on the all-stock decision. Intuitively, shocks to bidder market values create
deviations from capital structure targets, which in turn affect the payment method choice. In
particular, positive (leverage-reducing) shocks reduce the incentive to issue stock to pay for the
target. Consistent with this hypothesis, and with the evidence in Harford, Klasa, and Walcott
(2009) and Uysal (2011), we find that the probability of all-stock payment increases with excess
(book or market) leverage. We also find that the likelihood of all-stock financing decreases with
excess cash holdings, suggesting that bidders take into account the level of cash holdings as well.
While fully examining the payment method choice in a capital structure context goes beyond
this paper, this evidence raises the possibility that exogenous shocks to the bidder’s stock price
indirectly affect the all-stock financing choice through their effect on the bidder’s overall capital
structure optimization.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the data selection and sample
characteristics, and provides estimates of our baseline model for the all-stock payment choice.
Section 3 explains the estimation of bidder pricing errors, and presents the econometric methodology
behind and empirical results of the IV tests for whether or not all-stock mergers are market driven.
Section 4 describes the results of the event-studies and long-run performance estimation. Section 5
expands the baseline regression with new industry and location factors driving the payment method
choice, while Section 6 examines how the all-stock decision correlate with deviations from capital
structure targets. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 A baseline model for the all-stock payment choice
2.1 Sample selection and fraction all-stock offers
Our merger sample is drawn from Thompson’s Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. The
sample includes merger bids (successful and unsuccessful) from 1980-2008 where (1) both the bidder
and the target are U.S. domiciled, (2) the bidder is publicly traded, (3) the SDC transaction
type is “merger” (which eliminates asset acquisitions), and (4) SDC provides information on the
consideration structure (method of payment). When we also exclude financial firms (SIC codes
6000-6999), as well as 15 cases without a primary SIC code in SDC, this selection produces 11,394
merger bids on SDC. Of these, the 6-digit acquirer CUSIP is missing for 3,192 bids. Matching the
remaining 8,202 SDC records with CRSP and Compustat yields our final sample of 4,919 bidders
with the required financial information. The total bid value of this sample is in excess of $2.3
trillion.
Using the SDC information on deal consideration structure, we classify each bid into three
categories: all-stock, all-cash, and mixed cash-securities. Of the 4,919 merger bids, 31% are all-
stock, 29% are all-cash, and 40% are mixed. The proportion of all-stock merger bids is slightly
higher (35%) when measured as the dollar volume of all-stock bids to the total merger volume.
About one quarter of the mixed offers consist of stock and cash only, while the remaining bids
include some portion of debt, convertible securities, or other hybrid securities.5
5The average mixed stock-cash deal is split 50% stock and 50% cash. In mixed deals involving additional securities,
the average stock and cash portions are each around 40%.
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Table 1 reports the annual distribution of the number of bids and the fraction where the payment
method is all-stock, all-cash, and mixed. The table shows the distribution for the sample and, for
comparison purposes, for the larger SDC sample of 11,394 merger bids defined above. As shown,
our sample payment method proportions are quite representative of the larger SDC sample where
the proportions are 29% all-stock, 28% all-cash, and 42% mixed offers, respectively. Table 2 shows
the distribution of merger bids and the fraction of all-stock bids across the FF49 industries, sorted
in decreasing order of the fraction all-stock offers. The highest fraction is in the Coal industry where
all-stock bids represents 60% of the total number of takeover bids. Various technology industries
(e.g. Computer Software and Computers) also have a higher than average number of all-stock
deals. Examples of industries with a low fraction all-stock deals are Consumer Goods, Apparel and
Textiles, each having 16% all-stock offers.
Figure 1 plots the annual distribution of the number of bids and the percent all-stock bids in
the sample. Panel A plots bid frequency, while Panel B plots total dollar volume of merger bids and
the total value of all-stock bids as a fraction of the total merger volume. As shown in Panel A, the
yearly number of merger bids increases gradually from 1985 to a peak of 400+ in 1998. The fraction
all-stock bids follows a similar pattern, peaking in 1999 when nearly 50% of the deals were paid in
all-stock. After the burst of the “internet bubble”, the fraction all-stock bids declines through a
low of 4% at the end of our sample period (in year 2008), paralleling the decline in overall merger
activity.6 In Panel B, the value-weighted fraction of all-stock bids varies substantially across the
years, and exhibits less correlation with changes in deal volume. Total bid volumes peaks at $350+
billion annually in the years 1998-1999.
We perform our main analysis assuming bidders are primarily choosing between all-stock offers
and offers involving some cash (all-cash bids and bids mixing cash and securities). As shown below,
the main conclusion of this paper is robust with respect to changing the bidder’s choice to all-stock
versus all-cash (eliminating mixed bids from the analysis). However, modelling the decision as
one between an all-stock offer and a bid involving some cash is conceptually attractive for two
reasons. First, opportunistic bidders attempting to sell undervalued shares likely prefer not to mix
cash in the deal in order to maximize the transfer from the target. Second, Eckbo, Giammarino,
and Heinkel (1990) show that adding cash to the deal may lead to fully separating equilibria in
6The correlation between the annual number of merger bids and the fraction of all-stock bids is 52%.
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which the payment method fully reveals the bidder type. In such equilibria, all-stock offers are
preferred by the most overvalued bidders ex ante. We return to this possibility in the section on
announcement returns below.
2.2 Sample characteristics
Table 3 reports sample characteristics, classified by all-stock bids and bids involving some or all
cash. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Of the sample bids, 83% are successful (classified in
SDC as “completed”). The average deal size is 31% (median 13%) of the acquirer’s size, and 28%
of all targets are public. All-stock bids have a slightly higher completion rate and a larger relative
size than bids involving cash.
Several of the bidder firm characteristics are significantly different across the two subsamples.
All-stock acquirers are on average smaller (in total assets), and have higher M/B and R&D expenses
(scaled by total assets), and lower asset tangibility and net leverage (defined as the ratio of total
debt net of cash and total assets).7 Moreover, a lower fraction of acquirers making all-stock bids
are dividend payers. Table 3 further shows how all-stock deals differ from all-cash/mixed deals in
terms of industry relatedness and geographic location. In particular, all-stock is used more often
by bidders in the high-tech industry and in industries that are highly complementary with the
target industry in terms of sharing inputs and outputs. Moreover, bidders are more likely to select
all-stock as payment when the target is located within 30 miles range of the bidder (Local Deal).
Later in the analysis, we use these industry and location factors, which are new to the literature,
in a cross-sectional estimation of the payment method choice.
Finally, bidders using all-stock as consideration tend to operate in a different macroeconomic
environment at the time of the transaction. To capture industry-wide conditions, we create a
measure for industry merger waves that follows Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang (2012). Specifically,
for each FF49 49 industry and year, we calculate the aggregate dollar volume of mergers scaled by
the total assets of all Compustat firms in the industry. Industry Wave is the value of industry
merger-to-total assets in a given year, normalized by its mean and standard deviation over the
sample period. As reported in Table 3, the frequency of all-stock bids is higher in industry merger
7The M/B ratio is from Compustat and is defined as (share price)*(number of shares outstanding)/(total assets
- total liabilities).
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waves. The second macro variable is the credit spread, reflecting economy-wide liquidity conditions.
The credit spread is defined as the difference in yield between Moody’s AAA seasoned corporate
bonds and the three-month treasury bill. All-stock bids are more common in periods of lower credit
spreads.
2.3 Baseline choice model estimation
We estimate a baseline probit model where the dependent variable takes the value of one when the
consideration is all-stock and zero otherwise. The baseline model, reported in Table 4, includes
bidder firm characteristics and the two macro variables capturing industry- and economy-wide
business conditions.8 All bidder characteristics are from the year prior to year of the merger
announcement (defined in Appendix 1). Many of the explanatory variables produce significant
coefficients that are consistent with the univariate results shown in Table 3. The likelihood of
an all-stock bid is increasing in bidder’s M/B ratio and R&D expenditure, and decreasing in an
indicator for dividend payers, firm size (log of total assets) and net leverage. That is, small non-
dividend paying firms with relatively high growth and R&D intensity, and low leverage are more
likely to use their stock as acquisition currency.9
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 add the two macro variables Industry Wave and Credit Spread,
both of which produce highly significant coefficients. Consistent with the univariate results above,
firms are more likely to use all-stock payment when the aggregate merger activity in the industry
and market-wide liquidity is high. This complements the finding of Harford (2005) that merger
activity is driven by industry factors. These inferences also hold when including industry fixed
effects. The last column includes a dummy for public target and the bid premium offered for public
targets, neither of which are significant and are therefore not included in the subsequent analysis.
The finding that the propensity to pay with stock is higher for small, R&D intensive, non-
dividend paying high-growth firms with low leverage suggests that bidder financing constraints
may play a role in the payment method decision. We explore this possibility towards the end of
the paper (Section 6). We turn to effects of bidder valuation errors next.
8We do not include target firm characteristics in the baseline model since these are available only for the subsample
of public targets (28%).
9The two remaining firm characteristics—operating efficiency and asset tangibility—both produce insignificant
coefficients.
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3 Effects of bidder valuation errors on the payment method choice
The opportunistic financing hypothesis holds that all-stock bidders exploit market valuation errors
by selling overpriced shares. The baseline model in Table 4 shows that bidders are significantly
more prone to pay with all-stock when M/B is high. As emphasized in the introduction, this
positive correlation does not discriminate between neoclassical factors driving the all-stock decision
(such as growth opportunities and agency costs) and opportunistic financing behavior. To achieve
discrimination, we first transform M/B into a firm-specific valuation error using the technique in
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). We then instrument the firm-specific valuation
error using shocks to aggregate fund flows, and re-estimate the probability of all-stock payment
with the instrumented valuation error. Since aggregate fund flows are (likely) exogenous to the
bidder’s payment method decision, this IV test allows a relatively powerful examination of our
opportunistic financing hypothesis. For robustness, we also examine the impact of instrumenting
M/B itself, and we examine the impact of alternative measures of potential pricing errors, such as
the the price discount developed by Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) and the sentiment index
of Baker and Wurgler (2006).
3.1 Estimating bidder valuation errors
3.1.1 Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) firm-specific errors
We follow Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) and decompose bidder i’s market
value at time t, Mit into a fundamental (“true”) value at time t, denoted Vit, and a long-run
(time invariant) fundamental value, Vi. This is done by first estimating, in year t when the bid is
announced, the following cross-sectional regression, across the population of N Compustat firms in
bidder i’s Fama-French-16 industry (FF16):
Mjt = αt + βtXjt + ejt, j = 1, ..., N. (1)
Here, Mjt is the equity market value of the bidder i’s industry peer j, and the vector Xjt consists
of the book value of equity, operating cash flow, and net leverage, all at time t.10 Bidder i’s
10In Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), the vector X consists of book value of total assets, net
income, and leverage. Our variables differ slightly in order to maintain consistency with the variables used elsewhere
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fundamental value is the fitted value Vit ≡ αˆt + βˆtXit. Moreover, the fundamental long-run value
is Vi ≡ αi + βiXit, where α and β are the time series averages of the annual estimated values of αˆt
and βˆt, respectively, over the sample period (1980-2008).
The decomposition of M/B is as follows (where lower case denotes natural logarithm):
mit − bit = [mit − vit] + [vit − vi] + [vi − bit]. (2)
The first square bracket on the right-hand-side of Eq. (2) is the Firm-Specific Error: the difference
between the time t market value and fundamental value conditional on the industry j pricing rule.
This term captures purely firm-specific deviations from fundamental value, because Vit captures
deviations common to a sector at a point in time. The second square bracket is the Time Series
Sector Error: the difference between the time t fundamental value and the fundamental value based
on the long-run industry pricing rule. The third component is the Long-Run Value to Book: the
difference between the fundamental value based on the long-run industry pricing rule and acquirer
i’s book value of equity in year t.
3.1.2 Two alternative proxies of bidder mispricing
For robustness, we also examine the price discount developed by Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang
(2012). In their context, the discount represents the difference between the observed market value
and either the higher “full” value of the firm if managerial inefficiencies and agency costs were
absent, or market mispricing. Following their lead, we estimate the full value using a subset of the
most “successful” (highest-valued) industry peers, defined as firms in the top (1−α)th percentile of
market value in the FF16 industry of firm i in year t. By definition, the α% of firms with valuations
below the successful peers trade at a discount, and we follow Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012)
and set α = 0.8. The fundamental value Vit is now the fitted value from the quantile regression of
regression equation (1). By construction, quantile regressions yield (1−α)% positive residuals and
α% negative residuals. Successful firms are defined by a positive residual, eit > 0. The rest of the
firms trade at a discount. The Edman’s et. al’s Discount is then computed as (Vit −Mit)/Vit.
We also apply the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index, obtained from Jeffrey Wurgler’s
in our analysis.
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web site.11 This index is based on the first principal component of the following sentiment proxies:
a value-weighted dividend premium, IPO volume, first-day IPO returns, closed-end fund discount,
equity share of new securities issuances, and NYSE turnover.
3.2 Baseline model estimation without valuation error instrumentation
Table 5 shows the coefficient estimates in probit regressions for all-stock offers with the acquirer
misvaluation measures added to our baseline model (replacing M/B). The data requirements
reduces the sample size somewhat, to a total of 3,900 bids (which drops further to 3,445 observations
when the sentiment score is added). In column 1, which excludes the baseline model factors, the
decision to pay with stock is significantly and positively correlated with all three components of
M/B estimated using Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005).12 As shown in columns
2 and 3, which also exclude the baseline model factors, adding the Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang
(2012) discount and the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index also produces significant slope
coefficients.
However, when conditioning on the baseline model factors and industry fixed effects, several of
the valuation error proxies lose much of their statistical significance. This is true for the Baker and
Wurgler (2006) sentiment index, and for the Long-Run Value to Book factor, both of which become
insignificant at conventional levels. The Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) discount remains
significant at the five percent level. Given these results, we go forward and instrument the two
most significant measures of potential mispricing: M/B and Firm-Specific Error.
3.3 Baseline model estimation with valuation error instrumentation
3.3.1 The instrument
We use mutual fund price pressure as the instrumental variable. The price pressure of stock i in
quarter t is defined as:
zit ≡
∑
j(Fjtsij,t−1)
TV OLit
, (3)
11We use the original index, where the data is orthogonalized to a set of macroeconomic conditions, downloaded
from http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler.
12Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) find that the probability of merger activity increases with the
firm-specific and time-series sector pricing errors, while it decreases with the long-run pricing error.
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where Fjt is the net flow experienced by fund j in quarter t
Fjt ≡ TNAjt − TNAj,t−1(1 +Rjt), (4)
and where TNAjt is Total Net Assets and Rjt is the return for fund j from CRSP. As Edmans,
Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), we focus on larger fund flows and set Fjt = 0 when −5% < Fjt < 5%.
Note also that, while they use fund outflows only, we use both fund inflows and outflows. This is
because bidder misvaluation relevant for the payment method choice may in principle be driven by
both upward and downward price pressure.13
Moreover, the definition of sij,t−1, the share of stock i of fund j’s total net assets at the end of
the previous quarter, is given by:
sij,t−1 ≡ Shareij,t−1Pricei,t−1
TNAj,t−1
, (5)
where Sharei,j,t−1 is the number of stock i shares held by fund j from Thompson, and Pricei,t−1
is the price of stock i. Finally, TV OLit is the total dollar trading volume of stock i in quarter t
from CRSP.
The summation in (3) is over all non-sector specific funds, defined from the CRSP investment
objectives. Sector funds are excluded because flows to mutual funds specializing in a specific
industry might be correlated with industry shocks that also drive takeover activities and payment
methods. Moreover, we aggregate zit over the past four quarters to get the price pressure for each
calendar year prior to the takeover.
Since the price pressure zit is constructed using fund portfolio weights lagged one period (sij,t−1),
it presumes that the fund flow Fjt is passively scaled up or down, preserving lagged weights. In
other words, zit measures mutual funds’ hypothetical trades mechanically induced by flows by their
own investors. While the assumption of constant weights from t − 1 to t holds for passive funds,
other funds likely change their weights in period t (Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim, 2012). By lagging
the funds’ weights in bidder i to period t − 1, our instrument tends to neutralize the potentially
confounding effect of informed fund trades in year t (the year of the merger bid). This enhances
13As it turns out, the bulk of the instrument’s effect comes from fund inflows.
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the quality of our instrument: it is unlikely to reflect latent bidder characteristics also driving the
payment method choice. Under the opportunistic financing hypothesis the instrument affects the
payment method choice indirectly through its (exogenous) effect on the bidder’s stock price: shocks
that increase bidder overvaluation should also increase the probability of observing all-stock as
payment method.
3.3.2 Two-stage IV model
The baseline choice model estimated in Table 5 has the following form:
AllStock∗ = µ0(m− v) + µ1X + ξ (6)
AllStock = 1 if AllStock∗ > 0 and 0 otherwise
where AllStock∗ is the latent variable for the probability of an all-stock deal and AllStock is
the dummy variable for AllStock∗. As before, m − v is the firm-specific pricing error, and X is
the vector of bidder characteristics. The problem is that unobservable bidder characteristics may
affect both the pricing error and the payment method choice. The two-stage IV model addresses
this problem by first instrumenting the pricing error using Z in (3) and, second, transforming the
baseline choice model (6), as follows:
m− v = γ1X + γ2Z + η (7)
AllStock∗ = µ0(m− v) + µ1X + ληˆ + ξ′, (8)
where ηˆ is the vector of fitted residuals from the first stage OLS regression (7). Here, ηˆ is an
auxiliary regressor which “absorbs” the correlation between the error term and the m− v regressor
(Cov(η, ξ)), producing a well-behaved residual ξ′ (Rivers and Vuong, 1988; Edmans, Goldstein, and
Jiang, 2012).14
14To illustrate, let m̂− v denote the fitted regression value in (7). Equation (8) can then be rewritten as
AllStock∗ = µ0(m̂− v + ηˆ) + µ1X + ληˆ + ξ′ = µ0(m̂− v) + µ1X + (µ0 + λ)ηˆ + ξ′.
With linear functions in both steps, it would have sufficed to replace m− v with its fitted value in the second stage
estimation. Since the probit regression is nonlinear, however, the proper procedure is to substitute in the first-stage
fitted residual ηˆ in equation (8) (Rivers and Vuong, 1988). As a result, µ0 is unbiased for the effect on the payment
method of exogenous changes to the pricing error.
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3.3.3 Results of the IV test
Table 6 presents the results of estimating regression equation (7)—the first-stage relation between
mutual fund price pressure and the misvaluation measure. In columns 1-4, M/B is used as the
misvaluation measure, while columns 5-8 uses the firm-specific valuation error (the difference be-
tween acquirer market value and the fundamental value based on the industry pricing rule from
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)).
The coefficients on mutual fund flows are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level
for M/B and at the 1% level for Firm-Specific Error, indicating that firms with buying (selling)
pressure tend to have higher (lower) valuation errors. In columns 2-4 and 6-8, we include additional
controls for bidder characteristics, industry waves, credit spreads, and industry fixed effects from the
baseline regressions in Table 4. The estimated coefficients on fund flows are robust to the inclusion
of additional controls. Mutual fund flows have a strong impact on M/B and the firm-specific
valuation error, and the impact is seemingly unaffected by the bidder and macro characteristics.
The coefficient estimates from the instrumental variable regressions (the second stage) are re-
ported in Tables 7 and 8. Our main question is whether the higher (lower) acquirer valuation driven
by pure price shocks lead to a higher (lower) probability of stock mergers. First, for comparison
purposes, we estimate the non-instrumented regular probit regressions, reported in the first four
columns. Effectively, this is analogous to analyzing the relation between the misvaluation measure
and payment method under the assumption that the misvaluation is exogenous to any latent vari-
ables. We then run the regressions with instrumentation, reported in the last four columns. The
system of equations determining misvaluation and payment method is estimated simultaneously
using maximum likelihood estimators.
In columns 1 and 5, the misvaluation measure is the only explanatory variable. In the remaining
columns, we include bidder firm characteristics and macro variables from the baseline model. The
only difference is that the regressions use sales rank and market share instead of bidder firm size,
following Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012). As discussed above, if funds actively buy and
sell stocks in firms with certain latent characteristics, which are also associated with the choice of
payment method, one may be concerned that mutual fund price pressure is not a valid instrument.
Lagging the fund weights one period and including a large set of control variables, mitigate this
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concern.
The first four columns of Tables 7 and 8 show that the coefficients on the two misvaluation
measures (M/B and Firm-Specific Error) are positive and statistically significant, consistent with
Tables 4 and 5 above. This indicates that bidders with high market-to-book ratios and with valua-
tions in excess of the sector-level pricing benchmark are associated with a higher likelihood of stock
consideration. However, as discussed above, it is unclear whether these measures of misvaluation
reflect pure price shocks or omitted variables such as future investment opportunities.
Therefore, we turn to the second-stage (IV) results, reported in the last four columns. Impor-
tantly, the coefficients on the instrumented misvaluation is now of the opposite sign (negative) and
significant at the 1% level in both tables. In other words, with price pressure induced by mutual
fund flows as an instrument, we find an inverse relationship between acquirer excess price and stock
payment. The significant difference between the regular probit and the IV estimates suggests that
the uninstrumented probit estimation suffers from endogeneity as discussed above. The signs for
the control variables do not change, except for sales rank and market share.
The results of the IV estimation strongly contradicts the hypothesis that an exogenous increase
in the bidder’s valuation leads to a higher probability of stock mergers. We find the opposite effect.
A potential explanation for the inverse relationship is that a drop in the stock price increases the
firm’s debt ratio (and vice versa). As shown in Section 6 below, when leverage is above the firm’s
target level, the bidder tends to offer stock, bringing the debt ratio back towards its target. As
long as there are sufficient synergies in the transaction, paying with undervalued stock may still be
value increasing for the acquirer.
Two sets of tests for the instrument validity are reported at the bottom of each table. First,
we test the exogeneity of the equation system. The Wald statistics are large—in particular for
the firm-specific error—and significant at the 1% level in all specifications. This rejects the null
hypothesis that the pricing error is exogenous. The large Wald statistics together with the finding
that the coefficient estimates with and without instrumentation have different signs support the
need to control for endogeneity. The second test is a weak instrument test. The F-statistics of this
test are highly significant in all specifications, rejecting the null hypothesis that the instrument is
weak. This finding confirms that price pressure created by mutual fund flows is a good instrument
for bidder M/B and firm-specific valuation errors.
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3.4 Robustness
Table 9 shows results of the second stage of the IV test for specific subsamples of the data that may
increase the power to identify true bidder opportunism. The first four models restrict the sample
to all-stock versus all-cash bids, while the last four models are applied to deals where bidder
M/B exceeds target M/B. Comparing all-stock to all-cash bids increases power because all-cash
offers cannot reflect an incentive to sell overpriced shares (which may to some extent be present in
mixed cash-stock offers). Restricting bidder bidder M/B to exceed target M/B increases power by
increasing the likelihood in the data that the bidder is more overpriced than the target. In both
experiments, the table shows both the uninstrumented and the instrumented regressions. Despite
the sample reduction that these additional restrictions imply, the results are again statistically
significant: in the instrumented regressions, the probability of using all-stock as payment method
is again inversely related to the instrumented firm-specific pricing error.
In Table 10, we restrict the instrument to cover fund inflows (zeroing out fund outflows). This is
because fund inflows make up a majority of fund flows in our sample. Moreover, only fund inflows
directly create a potential for overvaluation. The table also conditions the IV test on the sign of
the firm-specific pricing error. This allows us to test whether the instrumented error receives the
positive sign predicted by the opportunistic financing hypothesis when the pricing error is positive.
The results in Table 10 are interesting. In the first two models (columns 1 and 2), we use fund
inflows only but do not condition on the sign of the uninstrumented pricing error. The instrumented
firm-specific pricing error again receives a negative and significant coefficient. The last four columns
show first the uninstrumented effect of the positive valuation error (columns 3 and 4) and then the
effect of instrumentation (columns 5 and 6). The probability of all-stock as payment method is
strongly increasing in the uninstrumented positive pricing error, while it is statistically independent
of the instrumented positive pricing error. These results further rejects the opportunistic financing
hypothesis.15
15Table 9 and Table 10 show that the instruments pass endogeneity and weak instrument tests. Moreover, while
we calculate robust standard errors to infer statistical significance, inferences based on clustered standard errors are
identical This holds also for Tables 7 and 8.
17
4 Does the payment method convey private information?
4.1 Market reaction to merger announcements
Dong, Hisrshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) and others argue that, if bidders successfully
time the market, opportunistic stock-sale announcements should induce abnormal stock returns
that are lower (more negative), the higher the market valuation error of the acquirer stock. In
this section, we examine how the method of payment affects the stock market reaction to the
acquisition announcement. A similar prediction follows from rational signaling models where the
bidder’s private information about its true stock value is revealed by the choice of payment method
(Fishman, 1989; Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel, 1990). Under either set of arguments, a negative
market reaction to the all-stock payment method is necessary to conclude that the all-stock choice
conveys information to the market.
We test this hypothesis below. Abnormal returns are estimated using the standard market
model as the return-generating process for bidder i in period t:
Rit = a+ bRmt + eit. (9)
We use CRSP’s daily holding period returns (dividends included) for Rit and value-weighted market
returns (dividends included) for Rm. The market model parameters are estimated over the window
[-291; -42] and we use [-1; 1] as the event window. The event date is the announcement date from
SDC. Our estimation procedure produces 4,442 merger announcement returns, with an average
acquirer abnormal return of 0.9%.
The coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of the acquirer’s announcement return is shown
in Table 11. The method of payment is captured by an indicator for all-stock offers. The regressions
introduce several interaction variables between all-stock bids and various valuation measures (M/B,
Firm-Specific Error and Edmans et al’s Discount), and they control for bidder characteristics and
industry fixed effects.
Note first that the dummy for all-stock produces insignificant coefficients in all specifications,
also when included on its own together with only industry fixed effects. While not shown here, the
insignificance of the all-stock dummy is also confirmed when comparing the announcement returns
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between all-stock and all-cash/mixed offers with propensity score matching of the bidders.16
Table 11 also shows that the interaction variables between all-stock and the various valuation
measures are all insignificant, as is the dummy for public target.17 However, as reported earlier by
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), bidder announcement
returns are negatively correlated with acquirer size. Moreover, bidder announcement returns are
increasing in the bidder’s net leverage, as if investors view acquisitions by financially constrained
bidders more favorably.
These results fail to support the proposition that the all-stock payment method choice signals
to the market that the bidder stock is overpriced. Alternatively, the insignificance of the all-stock
dummy may mean that the bidder succeeds in “fooling the market” into believing the payment
method is correctly priced. Under this misvaluation hypothesis, the market must realize that the
bidder is overpriced at some point after the bid announcement—or the concept of “overvaluation”
becomes meaningless. We test this prediction next.
4.2 Bidder post-merger abnormal performance
If the market fails to correct for bidder overvaluation at the bid announcement, then we should
observe long-term reversal of the bidder’s stock price over time. To examine this possibility, we
form calendar-time portfolios of all-stock and all-cash bidders and hold these for up to three years.
A bidder is in the month t portfolio if it has announced the acquisition between month t− 36 and
t. For each month, we compute the excess portfolio returns (in excess of the one-month Treasury
bill rate) in calendar time. This monthly excess return is then regressed on a four-factor model
consisting of the three Fama-French (FF) factors and momentum, and a second model where we
also add the traded liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).18
Table 12 reports the portfolio factor loadings and performance estimates (Alpha) using equal-
weights in Panel A and value-weights in Panel B.19 The first three columns present the results
16We match the treatment (all-stock) and control (all-cash/mixed) groups on Size, Operating Efficiency, M/B,
Dividend Dummy, R&D, Leverage, and Asset Tangibility.
17An interaction variable between public target and all-stock bid also produces an insignificant coefficient.
18The three FF factors are the excess market portfolio return, the average return difference between small- and
large-firm portfolios (SMB), and the average return difference between value- and growth-stock portfolios (HML).
The momentum factor (UMD) is the average return difference between up- and down-portfolios over the prior year.
19The weights for individual stocks in the value-weighted portfolio is the ratio of the firm’s market capitalization
to the total market capitalization of the portfolio, measured at the end of the previous month.
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for the FF three factors and momentum, while the last three columns show the results when
the liquidity factor is added. The portfolios of all-stock payers have a negative loading on HML
relative to the other portfolios. From the probit regressions above, we know that stock-payers tend
to have relatively high M/B compared to other acquirers. All the value-weighted portfolios have
lower loading on SMB than the equal-weighted portfolios, reflecting the greater influence of large
acquirers when the portfolio is weighted by firm size.
Importantly, the alpha estimates (the estimates of portfolio abnormal returns) are insignifi-
cant for all portfolios and in all regression specifications. In conjunction with the insignificant
announcement effect of the all-stock payment shown in the previous section, this finding rejects the
joint hypothesis that bidders successfully “fool” the market into believing that the stocks used as
payment for the targets are correctly priced when, according to the bidder’s information, they are
overpriced.
To explore the long-run valuation implications of stock-payment opportunism further, we form
portfolios sorted on the firm-specific pricing errors. The first two portfolios in Table 13 are the
top and bottom half, respectively, of mispriced firms offering all-stock consideration. The next
two portfolios are the top and bottom half, respectively, of mispriced firms offering all-cash consid-
eration. The last—and perhaps most interesting—portfolio is long the least mispriced firms (the
bottom half) that offers all-cash consideration and short the most mispriced firms (the top half)
that offers all-stock consideration. If overvalued firms opportunistically make stock bids, this port-
folio should generate positive abnormal returns in the long run. However, as shown in the table, all
portfolio alphas are insignificant from zero. This holds for both equal-weighted portfolios (Panel A)
and value-weighted portfolios (Panel B). Again, there is little support for the notion that bidders
pay with overvalued stock.
5 Expanding the baseline model: competition and geography
5.1 Industry relatedness and competition
Up to this point, we have used industry fixed effects to capture unique characteristics of the bidder’s
industry. In this section, we explore the impact of industry characteristics further, by developing
measures for bidder and target industry complementarity and bidder industry concentration. About
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half of our sample deals involve bidder-target pairs that operate in different FF49 industries. Con-
trolling for industry relatedness is potentially important as targets in related deals likely face lower
uncertainty in terms of estimating the value of bidder shares used in the transaction, thus facili-
tating the use of stock. Moreover, the degree of industry competition may also affect the payment
method: acquirers in relatively competitive industries tend to have less financial slack, which may
raise the likelihood of using stock to pay for the target. To account for these possibilities, we repeat
the IV-test using an expanded choice model.
We create two measures for industry relatedness by mapping all 4-digit SIC codes into the Input-
Output industry matrix of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and using the relatedness
measures of Fan and Lang (2000).20 V ertical Relatedness captures the fraction of input/output
of the acquirer industry bought from/sold to the target industry. Complementarity captures the
extent to which the acquirer industry and the target industry share the same input and output. We
further compute two measures for the product market competition in the acquirer’s FF49 industry
in a given year. The first is the adjusted Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), based on total
assets.21 The second measure is an indicator for industry leader, taking the value of one if the
acquirer’s total assets is in the top quintile in its FF49 industry.
The first three columns of Table 14 report the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for
the all-stock choice, adding industry characteristics as explanatory variables in addition to Firm-
Specific Error, and control variables from the baseline regressions in Table 4. The last three columns
report the same choice model, but with the firm-specific valuation error instrumented with price
pressure from mutual funds flow. The regressions include a dummy variable indicating that the
acquirer is in the FF49 high-tech industry. The variables Size, Dividend, R&D, and Leverage are
all replaced with the components (the fitted residuals) orthogonal to the industry variables because
the original variables are highly correlated with, in particular, Industry Leaders and High-Tech
Dummy.
The IV tests yield the same results as before, with a positive coefficient sign for Firm-Specific
20While not shown here, a third and simpler measure of relatedness, i.e. a dummy variable indicating that the
bidder and target operate in the same industry, also produces similar statistical inferences.
21HHI =
∑n
j X
2
j /
∑n
j Xj , where Xj is the total assets of firm j, j = 1, 2.., n, and n is the number of firms in the
industry. We use total assets because the panel data on sales is relatively noisy. The HHI index ranges from 0 to
1. The U.S. Department of Justice defines an industry as concentrated if its HHI exceeds 0.18 and competitive if its
HHI is below 0.10.
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Error, which switches to a negative sign when the variable is instrumented with mutual funds flow.
Again, the coefficients for misvaluation are highly significant in all specifications, as are the test
statistics in the exogeneity and weak instrument tests, respectively. In other words, the addition
of industry characteristics do not change the inferences with respect to the use of overvalued stock
as payment method.
Turning to the industry characteristics themselves, the probability of an all-stock deal is higher
when the acquirer and target industry share the same input/output (complementarity), and when
the acquirer is in the high-tech industry. The indicator for industry leader, which is marginally
significant in the simple probit regression, is positive and highly significant in the IV test. That is,
firms that are major players in their respective industries are more likely to use stock as payment
method. Adding the baseline bidder and macro control variables do not change any of the results.
Overall, bidder’s are more likely to make all-stock bids in the high-tech industry and when
the target and bidder industries share the same input and output. This is consistent with less
information asymmetries and higher synergy gains being important determinants of the deal con-
sideration. We next explore other links between the bidder and target that may reduce information
asymmetries about the value of the acquirer shares.
5.2 Geographic proximity and location
In this section, we study the relevance of the bidder’s and target’s geographic location for the
consideration choice. Target shareholders may have more information about the acquirer when
the two firms are located relatively closely. It is further possible that acquirers located in small
towns have a dominant position as an employer, and therefore are generally more well-known. If
geographic proximity reduces information asymmetries, we should observe more all-stock payments
in local deals.
We examine two measures of location: the distance between the acquirer and the target, and the
distance between the acquirer and a large metropolitan area. For each firm, we use zip codes from
SDC to calculate latitude (lat) and longitude (long) coordinates based on the 1987 U.S. Census
Gazetteer Files. Following Cai and Tian (2012), we compute the distance between acquirers and
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targets using the spherical law of cosines formula:
Distance = arccos[sin(lat1).sin(lat2) + cos(lat1).cos(lat2).cos(long2− long1)]R, (10)
where R is the radius of earth (3,963 miles), (lat1,long1) are the acquirer coordinates, and (lat2,long2)
are the target coordinates.
Merging firms are on average approximately 1,000 miles (median 600 miles) apart. However,
the distance variable is bimodal. A large number of bidder-target pairs are located in the same
zip code area, while many acquirers and targets are located on opposite sides of the country.22 We
define Local Deal as a takeover where the acquirer and the target are located within 30 miles from
each other.23 Following Cai and Tian (2012), we also construct an Urban Deal dummy, indicating
that the acquirer firm is located within 30 miles from one of the ten largest metropolitan areas.24
In our sample, 40% of the acquirers are located in, or close to, a large city.
The coefficient estimates from regular probit regressions for all-stock bids are reported in Table
15. As before, the dependent variable takes the value of one for all-stock transactions and zero
otherwise. The acquirer or target zip code is missing in SDC for 45% of the sample (2,215 deals).
We deal with this in two ways. First, we set Local Deal and Urban Deal, respectively, to zero for
cases with missing zip codes (shown in columns 1-3 and 6-7). Next, we eliminate the deals with
missing zip codes, reducing the sample size to 2,704 merger bids (shown in columns 4-5). As shown
in the table, the probability of all-stock consideration is higher for local deals. The local deal
dummy is robust to either way of dealing with missing zip codes and to the inclusion of industry-,
bidder- and macro characteristics.
The measures industry complementarity and the high-tech dummy remain highly significant
in all specifications. That is, geographic proximity and industry relatedness are both, and jointly,
important predictors of all-stock mergers. This supports the notion that information asymmetries
play a key role in the decision to pay with stock, where geographic proximity and industry links
between the bidder and the target may help reduce such information gaps.
22The distance between California and New York is around 2,500 miles.
23Kedia, Panchapagesan, and Usyal (2008) use a 100 kilometers (60 miles) cut-off in their study of acquirer returns.
24These are Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco,
and Washington DC. Coordinates of the city centers are obtained from www.world-gazetteer.com.
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6 A capital structure channel for the pricing error effect?
The above analysis shows that the instrumented M/B and firm-specific valuation error negatively
impacts the probability of using all-stock as payment. While this evidence rejects the opportunistic
financing hypothesis, it does not suggest the economic channel for this result. One potential channel
is the impact of exogenous price shocks on the bidder’s optimal (target) leverage ratio. Recall from
Table 4 that the likelihood of all-stock payment of the deal is decreasing in net leverage. One
possible explanation for this result is that all-stock bidder firms tend to be under-leveraged at the
time of the takeover bid and so prefer not to issue stock. Another possibility, however, is that
optimal leverage ratios of all-stock bidders tend to be low in the cross-section.
To further explore this leverage effect, we examine below whether the all-stock payment choice
also depends on bidder deviations from hypothetical leverage targets and target cash balances.
Exogenous price shocks directly create deviations from leverage targets, and they may also affect the
targets themselves (which depend on firm fundamentals). So, both current leverage and deviations
from leverage targets are possibly endogenous to price shocks. For example, since positive exogenous
price shocks lower the bidder’s market leverage, bidders may choose to pay for the target in cash
rather than in stock in order to help restore leverage back to a target. Since we use fund flows to
instrument misvaluation errors, we cannot use the same instrument for target leverage deviations.
Thus, we proceed by simply expanding the baseline model with deviations from cash and leverage
targets. Moreover, we expand the capital structure analysis by adding indicators for current-period
and lagged seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by the bidder.
We follow Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) and estimate for each year the deviation from
the acquirer’s target leverage as the fitted error term eˆ from the OLS regression
Leveraget = f(Xt−1) + e, (11)
where Xt−1 is a vector of lagged firm characteristics:
Xt−1 = {Sizet−1, Operating Efficiencyt−1, M/Bt−1, R&Dt−1, missing R&Dt−1,
Asset tangibilityt−1, FF49 industry}, (12)
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where missing R&Dt−1 is a dummy indicating a missing value for R&D in Compustat. Similarly,
we estimate the bidder’s excess cash holdings as the fitted residual gˆ from the OLS regression
Cash Holdingt = f(Xt−1, Leveraget−1) + g, (13)
where Cash Holding is cash/total assets and Xt−1 is the same vector of lagged firm characteristics.
Table 16 shows the time-series average of the coefficient estimates of the annual leverage and
cash regressions, respectively. In column 1, bidder Market Leverage (scaled by the sum of debt and
market value of equity) increases with size, operating efficiency, asset tangibility and the dummy
for missing R&D, and decreases with M/B and R&D expenses. In column 2, Book Leverage (scaled
by total assets) is decreasing in M/B and increasing in asset tangibility and the dummy for missing
R&D. In the regression for Cash (column 3), all variables enter with the opposite sign as for Market
Leverage. Moreover, cash holdings are decreasing in firm leverage.
Table 17 shows the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the all-stock choice. The
first four columns use market leverage, while the last four columns use book leverage. Whether
using market or book leverage, the likelihood of an all-stock bid is decreasing in the acquirer firm’s
target leverage and increasing in the deviation from the target leverage. Moreover, as reported
by Pinkowitz, Sturgess, and Williamson (2013) as well, bidders are more likely to use all-stock
consideration when their cash balances are relatively high. Additionally, we find that the all-stock
probability is significantly greater when cash balances are below their target. However, the table
also shows that the significance of cash holdings and excess cash balances are sensitive to the
inclusion of industry fixed effects. Thus, these variables likely reflect industry-specific cash-balance
effects as some industries (e.g. R&D intensive) rely more on cash finance than others. Overall, the
evidence suggests that bidders are more likely to choose all-stock when it helps adjust the capital
structure towards a target.
We also add two binary variables indicating that the bidder made a SEO in, respectively, the
year of, and the year before the merger bid. SEO data is from SDC’s new issues data base. Both
stock-issue dummies are significant, suggesting that firms issuing equity are also more likely to offer
all-stock. To the extent that the firm has been vetted by investors in a previous equity offering,
potential information asymmetries are reduced when offering the stock to target shareholders.
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The regressions further include a binary variable indicating that the relative size of the target
is in the top quartile. The cutoff point for the top quartile is deal values greater than 30% of the
acquirer’s total assets. The Large Deal Dummy receives a positive and highly significant coefficient
in all specifications. That is, controlling for acquirer size, bidders are more likely to offer all-stock
in relatively large deals. In columns 2 to 4 and 6 to 8, the regressions also control for the firm and
macro characteristics from the baseline model, which produce similar coefficients as before.
In sum, bidders with relatively low target leverage and high target cash balances tend to use
all-stock. Furthermore, bidders are more likely to offer stock when this reduces the deviation from
the target leverage and cash holdings. Also, firms raising cash in an equity offering are more likely
to use all-stock offers. These correlations are consistent with capital structure considerations being
an important determinant of the payment method choice.
7 Conclusion
We present significant new empirical evidence relevant for the ongoing controversy over whether
bidder shares in stock-financed mergers are overpriced. The extant literature is split on this issue,
with some studies suggesting that investor misvaluation plays an important role in driving stock-
financed mergers—especially during periods of high market valuations and merger waves—while
others maintain the neoclassical view of merger activity where takeover synergies emanate from
industry-specific productivity shocks. This debate is important because opportunities for selling
overpriced bidder shares may result in the most overvalued rather than the most efficient bidder
winning the target—distorting corporate resource allocation through the takeover market.
Our empirical analysis has three main parts. First, we build a baseline cross-sectional model
describing the choice of all-stock financing by public acquirers. The estimated (equilibrium) cor-
relations in this model describe how different market conditions and bidder firm characteristics
line up in the cross-section of all-stock bids versus bids involving some cash payment and/or debt
securities. This model shows that all-stock payment is more frequent among small, non-dividend
paying growth (high M/B and R&D intensive) companies and among companies with relatively
low leverage. These firms resemble companies which the capital structure literature often argues
face greater cost of raising cash externally.
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The regressions also show that the propensity to offer all-stock as payment increases during
industry merger waves, M/B, and in commonly used measures of firm-specific market valuation
errors. This evidence prompts the second part of our analysis: tests of the hypothesis that the choice
of all-stock financing is market driven. Here we use shocks to mutual fund flows as an instrument
to generate cross-sectional variation in bidder pricing errors which is exogenous to the bidder’s
payment method choice. Surprisingly, after instrumenting the bidder’s firm-specific pricing error,
we find that price shocks which increase bidder overvaluation significantly lowers the probability
of observing all-stock payments. To our knowledge, this represents the first systematic rejection in
the literature of the proposition that the all-stock payment choice is stock market driven.
In the third part of the paper, we expand the baseline model with industry- and location factors
that have not been previously examined in the context of the payment method choice. Here, we
find that bidder-target industry relatedness, as well as the geographic proximity of the target, also
drive the payment method choice. A consistent interpretation is that bidders tend to self-select
all-stock financing when targets are likely to be well informed about the true value of the bidder
shares. Overall, the large-sample evidence presented in this paper does not suggest a particular
role for market overpricing driving the bidder’s payment method choice.
While we do not resolve the question of what drives the surprising negative effect of exogenous
bidder pricing shocks on the all-stock payment decision, we suggest a possible capital structure
channel: positive shocks that cause under-leverage relative to some target reduce the incentive to
issue stock to pay for the investment in the target. Consistent with this suggestion, we show that
the all-stock payment decision is correlated with deviations from both leverage and cash targets,
and with prior seasoned equity offerings, as predicted.
Finally, an interesting but hitherto unexplored question is whether opportunistic sale of over-
price shares gives rise to a costly ex post settling up between bidder managements and unhappy tar-
get shareholders who become large shareholders in the merged firm. Since all-stock deals are more
likely when the target and bidder firms are of a similar firm size (shown here), target shareholders
following all-stock deals often hold a sizeable block of shares in the merged company. Consequently,
they may be in a position to impose significant personal costs on bidder management and directors
who prefer to continue in their roles as top executives. For example, Steve Case, the CEO of AOL
assumed the role as Chairman of AOL Time Warner in 2000 and subsequently retired from this role
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in 2003. Was Steve Case forced out by disgruntled former Time Warner shareholders considering
the sale of AOL stocks as opportunistic? If so, at what personal costs to Mr. Case? The key
to understanding the payment method decision in takeovers may require answers to this type of
corporate governance questions as well.
28
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Figure 1
Distribution of Merger Bids and Fraction of All-Stock Merger Bids in the Sample
The figure plots the distribution of merger bids and the fraction of all-stock merger bids over the sample period.
Panel A shows the frequency and Panel B the value of the merger bids. The sample is 4,919 merger bids from SDC in
1980-2008 that involve U.S targets and U.S. public acquirers with complete financial information, excluding bidders
with SIC codes 6000-6999 (financial firms) and missing SIC-code.
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Table 1
Time-Series Breakdown of Methods of Payment
The table reports the number of mergers and methods of payment by year. The SDC sample includes 11,394 merger
bids from 1980 to 2008 that involve (1) acquirers and targets incorporated in the U.S. and (2) public acquirers,
excluding financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and firms with unknown industry classification. Our sample is 4,919
mergers in the SDC sample with complete financial information. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
Year All Deals % All-stock % All-cash % Mixed
SDC Sample SDC Sample SDC Sample SDC Sample
1980 27 16 37 44 19 25 44 31
1981 265 116 19 23 56 47 25 29
1982 415 146 9 10 72 75 19 14
1983 738 256 12 14 74 76 14 11
1984 783 252 13 16 67 67 20 17
1985 130 51 23 25 38 35 39 39
1986 157 70 17 20 45 46 38 34
1987 149 85 26 26 37 35 38 39
1988 156 95 17 19 49 47 34 34
1989 204 90 25 21 25 14 50 64
1990 222 108 30 32 14 15 55 53
1991 270 137 38 37 10 11 52 52
1992 273 133 37 38 8 11 55 52
1993 304 165 35 31 18 22 47 47
1994 378 226 40 34 19 17 41 50
1995 496 258 44 44 18 17 39 39
1996 505 306 47 48 13 13 40 39
1997 652 404 45 46 15 15 39 39
1998 778 417 40 43 17 16 44 41
1999 612 307 44 50 16 15 40 36
2000 671 310 48 46 12 16 40 38
2001 436 150 36 29 14 18 51 53
2002 293 93 34 29 16 27 50 44
2003 329 103 28 14 18 35 55 51
2004 372 112 22 12 19 38 59 50
2005 462 141 17 7 24 45 59 48
2006 489 141 13 11 21 39 66 50
2007 463 131 16 8 22 48 62 44
2008 365 100 12 4 21 35 66 61
Total 11,394 4,919 29 31 28 29 42 40
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Table 2
Industry Distribution of Acquirers
The table reports the total dollar volume of merger bids (in $ thousand) and the fraction of all-stock bids by the
acquirer’s industry. The sample is 4,919 merger bids from SDC in 1980-2008 that involve U.S targets and U.S.
public acquirers with complete financial information, excluding bidders with SIC codes 6000-6999 (financial firms)
and missing SIC-code. The % All-Stock Mergers is the fraction of all mergers paid in stock by number and volume,
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. The rows are ordered by frequency based on % All-Stock
Mergers.
All Mergers % All-Stock Mergers
Frequency $ Volume by number by volume
Coal 5 549 60 99
Computer Software 704 220,040 48 56
Computers 198 67,964 44 43
Precious Metals 21 4,163 43 68
Electronic Equipment 324 107,411 42 50
Construction 63 4,073 38 59
Business Services 296 36,793 38 40
Retail 288 117,839 36 16
Medical Equipment 153 29,188 35 47
Pharmaceutical Products 154 317,865 34 73
Agriculture 21 3,899 33 2
Defense 3 497 33 10
Other 218 65,615 32 15
Measuring and Control Equipment 144 26,377 31 22
Personal Services 91 8,091 30 39
Health care 135 19,321 28 12
Transportation 68 18,003 28 8
Entertainment 74 52,884 27 5
Machinery 161 25,730 27 43
Electrical Equipment 100 7,429 27 31
Fabricated Products 27 1,877 26 15
Petroleum and Natural Gas 247 255,058 26 23
Communication 204 583,758 25 32
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 63 5,995 24 6
Wholesale 244 25,915 23 15
Rubber and Plastic Products 40 5,448 20 18
Consumer Goods 75 16,228 16 10
Apparel 56 7,358 16 14
Textiles 31 6,875 16 11
Steel Works Etc 91 33,005 16 4
Automobiles and Trucks 66 21,212 15 5
Food Products 99 42,909 14 3
Business Supplies 73 47,164 14 36
Chemicals 80 32,479 13 2
Construction Materials 100 7,819 13 34
Aircraft 39 34,377 13 40
Beer and Liquor 17 18,538 12 0
Recreation 37 7,559 8 0
Utilities 15 8,485 7 0
Shipping Containers 17 1,801 6 2
Printing and Publishing 57 12,686 4 0
Candy and Soda 4 1,041 0 0
Tobacco Products 1 19,275 0 0
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 9 1,103 0 0
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 6 11,998 0 0
Total 4,919 2,343,693 31 35
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Table 4
Baseline Regressions for the Probability of All-Stock Payment
The table reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the probability of an all-stock merger bid
(vs. an all-cash/mixed bid). The explanatory variables are bidder firm characteristics, an industry wave indicator,
Moody’s credit spread, and deal characteristics. Firm-specific variables are lagged by one year. Also estimated,
but not reported, is a constant term. The sample is 4,919 merger bids for U.S. targets by U.S. public acquirers in
1980-2009. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Z-statistics are in paranthesis, using robust standard errors. *,
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Bidder characteristics:
Size -0.014 -0.017 -0.005 -0.021 -0.025 -0.028
(1.50) (1.73)* (0.46) (2.21)** (2.50)** (2.71)***
Operating Efficiency -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(1.05) (1.15) (1.59) (1.15) (1.34) (1.18)
Market to Book Equity 0.021 0.019 0.014 0.021 0.02 0.02
(4.85)*** (4.50)*** (3.13)*** (4.92)*** (4.55)*** (4.62)***
Dividend Dummy -0.338 -0.231 -0.206 -0.344 -0.234 -0.23
(7.82)*** (5.10)*** (4.23)*** (7.82)*** (5.10)*** (5.03)***
Net Leverage -0.558 -0.465 -0.606 -0.579 -0.483 -0.462
(6.65)*** (5.37)*** (6.58)*** (6.73)*** (5.42)*** (5.20)***
R&D 1.258 0.995 0.979 1.139 0.86 0.846
(4.73)*** (3.34)*** (3.12)*** (4.15)*** (2.81)*** (2.77)***
Asset Tangibility -0.091 -0.074 -0.085 -0.066 -0.042 -0.047
(1.39) (0.94) (1.01) (1.00) (0.52) (0.59)
Macro characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.076 0.078 0.076
(5.17)*** (5.14)*** (4.99)***
Credit Spread -0.083 -0.078 -0.076
(4.58)*** (4.18)*** (4.11)***
Deal characteristics:
Public Target Dummy -0.01
(0.23)
Public Target Dummy x Target Premium 0.06
(1.11)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.08
N 4919 4899 4899 4786 4766 4766
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Table 5
Stock-Market Valuation and the Payment Method Choice
The table reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the probability of an all-stock merger bid (vs.
an all-cash/mixed bid). The explanatory variables are the components of market-to-book equity, investor sentiment,
and control variables from the baseline model in Table 4. The three components of market-to-book equity (Firm-
Specific Error, Time-Series Sector Error, and Long-Run Value to Book) are based on Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and
Viswanathan (2005). Edmans et.al’s Discount is based on Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012). Sentiment is the
aggregate investor sentiment index from Baker and Wurgler (2006). The firm-specific variables are lagged by one
year. Also estimated, but not reported, is a constant term. The sample is 3,900 merger bids for U.S. targets by U.S.
public acquirers in 1980-2008. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Z-statistics are in parentheses, using robust
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Valuation measures:
Firm-Specific Error 0.155 0.144 0.17 0.148 0.155 0.158
(5.93)*** (5.28)*** (5.90)*** (5.01)*** (4.97)*** (4.94)***
Time-Series Sector Error 0.524 0.521 0.384 0.295 0.332 0.296
(6.58)*** (6.53)*** (4.54)*** (3.44)*** (3.82)*** (3.30)***
Long-Run Value to Book 0.78 0.784 0.781 0.25 0.235 0.115
(9.09)*** (9.07)*** (8.56)*** (2.31)** (2.07)** (0.76)
Edmans et. al’s Discount -0.045 -0.089 -0.111 -0.118 -0.135
(1.65)* (2.25)** (2.45)** (2.15)** (2.33)**
Sentiment 0.195 0.097 0.066 0.063
(3.68)*** (1.71)* (1.10) (1.02)
Bidder characteristics:
Size -0.019 -0.023 -0.031
(1.44) (1.66)* (2.02)**
Operating Efficiency -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.39) (0.41) (0.61)
Dividend Dummy -0.307 -0.33 -0.235
(5.95)*** (6.28)*** (4.28)***
Net Leverage -0.735 -0.797 -0.767
(7.39)*** (7.79)*** (7.03)***
R&D 0.624 0.508 0.619
(1.98)** (1.58) (1.68)*
Asset Tangibility -0.077 -0.048 -0.038
(0.99) (0.61) (0.39)
Macro characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.034 0.036
(1.92)* (1.96)*
Credit Spread -0.15 -0.137
(6.20)*** (5.51)***
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.10
N 3900 3900 3540 3540 3445 3420
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Table 6
Determinants of Market-to-Book Equity and Firm-Specific Error (IV Stage 1)
The table reports the coefficient estimates from the first-stage IV regressions for M/B and Firm-Specific Error. The
explanatory variables are Mutual Fund Flow (price pressure from mutual fund flows), Sales Rank, Market Share, and
other control variables from the baseline model in Table 4. Firm-Specific Error of market-to-book equity is based on
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). All firm characteristics are lagged by one year. Also estimated,
but not reported, is a constant term. The sample is 3,900 merger bids for U.S. targets by U.S. public acquirers in
1980-2008. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. The t-statistics are in parentheses, using robust standard errors.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Market to Book Firm-Specific Error
Instrument:
Mutual Fund Flow 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.018 0.018 0.017
(3.40)*** (2.25)** (2.19)** (2.35)** (7.49)*** (4.17)*** (4.02)*** (4.00)***
Bidder characteristics:
Sales Rank 0.933 0.913 0.736 0.662 0.653 0.64
(3.05)*** (2.96)*** (2.28)** (12.25)*** (11.91)*** (11.49)***
Market Share 3.26 3.591 3.701 1.502 1.617 1.635
(1.98)** (2.18)** (1.69)* (3.51)*** (3.71)*** (3.37)***
Operating Efficiency 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001
(0.09) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.23) (0.22)
Dividend Dummy -0.171 -0.156 -0.037 -0.019 -0.013 -0.009
(0.92) (0.82) (0.18) (0.61) (0.41) (0.27)
Net Leverage -0.385 -0.407 -0.204 0.224 0.203 0.285
(0.97) (0.99) (0.50) (3.02)*** (2.68)*** (3.77)***
R&D 7.768 8.03 7.154 1.853 1.878 1.747
(3.91)*** (3.93)*** (2.99)*** (6.74)*** (6.72)*** (5.43)***
Asset Tangibility -0.838 -0.809 -0.229 -0.096 -0.087 -0.014
(2.95)*** (2.77)*** (0.56) (2.00)** (1.80)* (0.21)
Macro characteristics:
Industry Wave -0.115 -0.145 -0.019 -0.021
(1.89)* (2.26)** (1.75)* (1.85)*
Credit Spread -0.030 -0.000 -0.015 -0.014
(0.42) (0.52) (1.21) (1.15)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R2 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.13
N 4919 4027 3922 3902 3900 3900 3803 3784
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Table 7
Instrumenting Market-to-Book Equity in the All-Stock Choice (IV Stage 2)
The table reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the choice of all-stock merger bids vs. all-
cash/mixed bids. The explanatory variables are M/B, Sales Rank, Market Share, and other control variables from
the baseline model in Table 4. In the first four columns, the estimates are from regular probit regressions. In the last
four columns, M/B is instrumented by price pressure from mutual fund flows. Firm characteristics are lagged by one
year. Also estimated, but not reported, is a constant term. The sample is 4,919 merger bids for U.S. targets by U.S.
public acquirers in 1980-2008. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Z-statistics are in parentheses, using robust
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
Uninstrumented Regressions Instrumented Regressions
Valuation measures:
Market-to-Book 0.03 0.022 0.022 0.021 -0.166 -0.175 -0.177 -0.177
(6.87)*** (4.87)*** (5.02)*** (4.73)*** (7.10)*** (7.77)*** (8.02)*** (8.17)***
Bidder characteristics:
Sales Rank -0.225 -0.208 -0.256 0.095 0.102 0.046
(3.14)*** (2.86)*** (3.41)*** (1.12) (1.23) (0.53)
Market Share -1.434 -1.68 -1.256 0.12 0.107 0.363
(1.86)* (2.19)** (1.49) (0.22) (0.18) (0.57)
Operating Efficiency -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.88) (0.77) (1.05) (0.18) (0.14) (0.32)
Dividend Dummy -0.277 -0.298 -0.215 -0.143 -0.145 -0.093
(5.83)*** (6.15)*** (4.26)*** (2.44)** (2.33)** (1.73)*
Net Leverage -0.548 -0.568 -0.517 -0.308 -0.314 -0.263
(6.31)*** (6.33)*** (5.55)*** (2.62)*** (2.55)** (2.22)**
R&D 1.038 0.944 0.791 1.868 1.871 1.661
(3.85)*** (3.41)*** (2.52)** (5.15)*** (5.00)*** (3.75)***
Asset Tangibility -0.093 -0.048 0.057 -0.197 -0.173 -0.022
(1.35) (0.69) (0.67) (3.39)*** (2.91)*** (0.26)
Macro characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.076 0.069 0.009 0.002
(4.73)*** (4.17)*** (0.47) (0.08)
Credit Spread -0.057 -0.054 -0.031 -0.032
(2.91)*** (2.68)*** (1.60) (1.72)*
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Exogeneity tests :
Wald Statistic 17.36 10.75 10.71 11.86
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Weak Instrument tests :
F Statistic 22.01 8.3 9.1 9.1
p-value <0.001 0.004 0.002 0.002
N 4919 4027 3922 3902 4919 4027 3922 3902
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Table 8
Instrumenting Firm-Specific Error in the All-Stock Choice (IV Stage 2)
The table reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the choice of all-stock merger bids vs. all-
cash/mixed bids. The explanatory variables are Firm-Specific Error, Sales Rank, Market Share, and other control
variables from the baseline model in Table 4. Firm-Specific Error is based on the Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and
Viswanathan (2005) decomposition of M/B. In the first four columns, the estimates are from regular probit re-
gressions. In the last four columns, Firm-Specific Error is instrumented by price pressure from mutual fund flows,
estimated in Table 6. Firm characteristics are lagged by one year. Also estimated, but not reported, is a constant
term. The sample is 3,900 merger bids for U.S. targets by U.S. public acquirers in 1980-2008. All variables are de-
fined in Appendix 1. Z-statistics are in parentheses, using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Uninstrumented Regressions Instrumented Regressions
Valuation measures:
Firm-specific Error 0.129 0.158 0.166 0.171 -0.824 -0.924 -0.944 -0.966
(5.29)*** (5.95)*** (6.09)*** (6.16)*** (9.99)*** (7.90)*** (8.33)*** (8.80)***
Bidder characteristics:
Sales Rank -0.292 -0.28 -0.333 0.537 0.553 0.53
(3.88)*** (3.65)*** (4.18)*** (4.38)*** (4.66)*** (4.38)***
Market Share -1.5 -1.787 -1.366 0.889 0.927 1.451
(1.91)* (2.27)** (1.58) (1.30) (1.32) (1.91)*
Operating Efficiency -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.35) (0.32) (0.53) (0.18) (0.40) (0.47)
Dividend Dummy -0.282 -0.302 -0.222 -0.159 -0.157 -0.112
(5.80)*** (6.10)*** (4.31)*** (2.98)*** (2.80)*** (2.21)**
Net Leverage -0.779 -0.816 -0.772 -0.189 -0.209 -0.091
(8.31)*** (8.49)*** (7.62)*** (1.28) (1.38) (0.60)
R&D 0.72 0.578 0.512 2.227 2.202 2.067
(2.53)** (1.99)** (1.56) (7.45)*** (7.08)*** (5.86)***
Asset Tangibility -0.06 -0.02 0.079 -0.132 -0.103 0.022
(0.82) (0.27) (0.87) (2.14)** (1.66)* (0.26)
Macro characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.076 0.073 0.018 0.013
(4.68)*** (4.30)*** (0.99) (0.70)
Credit Spread -0.059 -0.053 -0.047 -0.043
(2.93)*** (2.59)*** (2.76)*** (2.53)**
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Exogeneity tests :
Wald Statistic 41.55 19.27 19.73 20.78
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Weak Instrument tests:
F-Statistic 48.35 14.73 10.783 11.223
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
N 3900 3900 3803 3784 3900 3900 3803 3803
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Table 9
IV tests for subsamples of all-stock and all-cash bids, and bidder M/B > target M/B
The table reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the choice of all-stock merger bids vs. all-
cash/mixed bids. In the first for column, the sample is restricted to all-stock and all-cash bids, excluding the mixed
offers (N=2,191). In the last four columns, the sample is restricted to merger bids where acquirer M/B is greater
than target M/B (N=677). The explanatory variables are Firm-specific Error, Sales Rank, Market Share, and control
variables from the baseline model in Table 4. Firm-Specific Error is computed following Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson,
and Viswanathan (2005). In columns 3-4 and 7-8, Firm-specific Error is instrumented by price pressure from mutual
fund flows. Firm characteristics are lagged by one year. Also estimated, but not reported, is a constant term. The
sample is merger bids for U.S. targets by U.S. public acquirers in 1980-2008. All variables are defined in Appendix
1. Z-statistics are in parentheses, using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
Sample: All-stock and All-cash bids Bidder M/B > Target M/B
Misvaluation: Uninstrumented Instrumented Uninstrumented Instrumented
Valuation measures:
Firm-specific Error 0.109 0.136 -1.090 -1.105 0.115 0.155 -1.437 -1.608
(3.01)*** (3.43)*** (11.65)*** (12.08)*** (1.58) (1.78)* (13.92)*** (13.14)***
Bidder characteristics:
Sales Rank -0.821 -0.818 0.413 0.355 -0.189 -0.392 0.685 0.8
(7.92)*** (7.20)*** (2.26)** (2.08)** (0.96) (1.73)* (3.58)*** (3.54)***
Market Share -2.158 -2.978 1.205 1.793 -2.028 -2.659 2.972 6.188
(2.11)** (2.47)** (1.58) (1.97)** (1.20) (1.21) (2.71)*** (3.84)***
Operating Efficiency -0.004 -0.008 0.008 0.005 0.013 0.006 0.006 0.017
(0.77) (1.41) (1.28) (0.71) (1.27) (0.49) (0.41) (1.16)
Dividend Dummy -0.421 -0.349 -0.19 -0.163 -0.168 -0.015 -0.113 -0.056
(6.80)*** (5.07)*** (2.52)** (2.32)** (1.45) (0.11) (1.15) (0.53)
Net Leverage -0.957 -1.021 -0.3 -0.245 -0.876 -0.897 0.367 0.204
(6.94)*** (6.79)*** (1.66)* (1.28) (3.45)*** (3.01)*** (1.24) (0.63)
R&D 0.707 0.936 1.816 1.669 2.202 2.293 2.648 2.708
(1.54) (1.65)* (4.91)*** (3.72)*** (2.60)*** (2.22)** (3.20)*** (2.74)***
Asset Tangibility -0.013 0.053 -0.049 0.166 0.218 0.209 -0.002 0.049
(0.13) (0.41) (0.61) (1.53) (1.37) (0.88) (0.02) (0.29)
Macro characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.094 0.009 0.048 -0.005
(3.62)*** (0.35) (1.10) (0.14)
Credit Spread -0.033 -0.034 -0.082 -0.09
(1.08) (1.52) (1.49) (2.07)**
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneity Tests :
Wald Statistic 17.28 20.49 3.08 3.35
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Weak Instrument Tests :
F Statistic 7.05 6.39 0.08 0.60
p-value 0.010 0.010 0.776 0.440
N 2191 2129 2191 2129 677 623 677 623
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Table 10
IV tests using net inflows, and conditioning on the sign of the valuation error
The table reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the choice of all-stock merger bids vs. all-
cash/mixed bids. In columns 1-2, Firm-specific Error is instrumented with mutual fund net inflows. In columns 5-6,
Firm-specific Error is instrumented with net inflows when positive and with net outflows when negative. Positive
Error is a dummy indicating that Firm-Specific Error ≥ 0. The explanatory variables are Firm-specific Error, Sales
Rank, Market Share, and control variables from the baseline model in Table 4. Firm characteristics are lagged by one
year. Firm-Specific Error is computed following Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). Also estimated,
but not reported, is a constant term. The sample is 3,900 merger bids for U.S. targets by U.S. public acquirers in
1980-2008. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Z-statistics are in parentheses, using robust standard errors. *,
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
Instrument: Net Inflows Uninstrumented Net in- and outflows
Valuation measures:
Firm-specific Error -0.924 -0.967
(7.91)*** (8.81)***
Firm-specific Error 0.168 0.160 -4.605 -5.919
* Positive Error (3.75)*** (3.49)*** (1.34) (1.46)
Firm-specific Error 0.064 0.115 -6.205 -5.013
* (1-Positive Error) (1.00) (1.57) (1.07) (0.95)
Positive Error 0.075 0.073 9.805 9.627
(1.14) (1.05) (1.10) (1.20)
Bidder characteristics:
Sales Rank 0.538 0.530 -0.288 -0.336 -0.060 -0.322
(4.39)*** (4.38)*** (3.76)*** (4.15)*** (0.08) (0.43)
Market Share 0.890 1.452 -1.581 -1.412 -5.213 -2.129
(1.30) (1.91)* (1.99)** (1.63) (0.81) (0.42)
Operating Efficiency -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.007 0.008
(0.18) (0.47) (0.32) (0.50) (0.58) (0.55)
Dividend Dummy -0.159 -0.112 -0.282 -0.223 -0.361 -0.322
(2.98)*** (2.20)** (5.79)*** (4.33)*** (2.19)** (1.94)*
Net Leverage -0.188 -0.091 -0.779 -0.769 0.320 0.684
(1.27) (0.60) (8.32)*** (7.58)*** (0.39) (0.69)
R&D 2.228 2.067 0.713 0.516 5.032 5.740
(7.45)*** (5.86)*** (2.50)** (1.58) (1.75)* (1.71)*
Asset Tangibility -0.132 0.022 -0.055 0.080 -0.084 0.205
(2.14)** (0.26) (0.76) (0.88) (0.29) (0.71)
Macro characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.013 0.072 -0.023
(0.70) (4.27)*** (0.28)
Credit Spread -0.043 -0.053 -0.108
(2.53)** (2.56)** (1.18)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneity Tests :
Wald Statistic 19.29 20.78 15.54 16.56
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Weak Instrument Tests :
F Statistic 14.82 11.24 9.81;5.69;6.35a 7.10;6.60;6.59a
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
N 3900 3784 3900 3784 3900 3784
a There are three reported F-statistics, one for each of three instruments: (1) Mutual fund flow if Mutual fund flow > 0 and 0
otherwise. (2) Mutual fund flow if Mutual fund flow < 0 and 0 otherwise. (3) Positive mutual fund flow dummy = 1 if Mutual
fund flow > 0 and 0 otherwise.
42
Table 11
Determinants of Acquirer Announcement Returns
The table reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions for the acquirer announcement abnormal returns in event
days [-1,1], estimated from a standard market model. The explanatory variables are All-Stock Dummy, valuation
measures, and their interactions, Public Target dummy, and other control variables from the baseline model in Table
4. Firm characteristics are lagged by one year. Also estimated, but not reported, is a constant term. The sample
is 4,442 merger bids for U.S. targets by U.S. public acquirers in 1980-2008. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
The t-statistics are in parentheses, using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Payment method and valuation measures:
All Stock Dummy 0.22 0.679 0.266 0.809 0.364 0.706 0.232 0.756
(0.57) (1.29) (0.53) (1.59) (0.88) (1.32) (0.46) (1.47)
Market to Book Equity 0.059 0.054
(1.10) (1.01)
All Stock x Market to Book -0.047 -0.056
(0.56) (0.68)
Firm-Specific Error -0.056 -0.118
(0.16) (0.34)
All Stock x Firm-Specific Error 0.299 0.222
(0.44) (0.33)
Edmans et al’s Discount 1.837 1.845
(1.68)* (1.68)*
All Stock x Discount -2.769 -2.779
(1.43) (1.44)
Deal characteristics:
Public Target -0.492 -0.601 -0.57 -0.476 -0.598 -0.556
(1.40) (1.39) (1.32) (1.33) (1.36) (1.27)
Bidder characteristics:
Size -0.703 -0.76 -0.662 -0.678 -0.743 -0.654
(6.14)*** (6.15)*** (5.04)*** (5.99)*** (5.74)*** (4.80)***
Operating Efficiency -0.002 -0.026 -0.025 -0.007 -0.034 -0.032
(0.06) (0.74) (0.71) (0.21) (0.95) (0.88)
Dividend Dummy 0.663 0.924 0.915 0.646 0.934 0.904
(1.71)* (2.23)** (2.20)** (1.52) (2.16)** (2.08)**
Net Leverage 3.825 3.298 3.225 3.719 3.055 3.068
(2.88)*** (3.11)*** (3.13)*** (2.64)*** (2.61)*** (2.67)***
R&D -0.278 -1.154 -0.475 1.241 0.019 0.522
(0.10) (0.41) (0.17) (0.40) (0.01) (0.17)
Asset Tangibility -0.449 -0.456 -0.353 -0.916 -0.432 -0.378
(0.84) (0.88) (0.68) (1.17) (0.62) (0.56)
Macro characteristics:
Industry Wave -0.132 -0.311 -0.326 -0.122 -0.314 -0.32
(0.87) (2.13)** (2.20)** (0.79) (2.09)** (2.10)**
Credit Spread 0.109 0.083 0.112 0.145 0.116 0.155
(0.82) (0.52) (0.69) (1.06) (0.72) (0.94)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05
N 4442 4324 3426 3426 4442 4324 3426 3426
43
Table 12
Acquirer Post-Merger Portfolio Returns
The table reports the coefficient estimates from calendar time portfolio regressions. The dependent variable is the
monthly returns on portfolios of all acquirers, all-stock acquirers, and all-cash acquirers, respectively. An acquirer
will be in month t portfolio if it has announced the acquisition between month t-36 and t. The explanatory variables
are the Fama-French three factors, momentum, and the traded liquidity factor from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
Rm is excess return on the market. SMB is the average return on small- minus large-stock portfolios. HML is the
average return on value- minus growth portfolios. UMD is the average return on up minus down portfolios. The
monthly returns on acquirer portfolios are equal-weighted in Panel A and value-weighted in panel B. All variables
are defined in Appendix 1. t-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are robust. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
All All-Stock All-Cash All All-Stock All-Cash
Panel A: Equal-weighted returns
Alpha -0.062 -0.233 0.003 -0.126 -0.373 -0.015
(0.55) (1.07) (0.03) (1.10) (1.86)* (0.13)
Risk Factors:
Rm 1.06 1.145 0.993 1.068 1.12 0.99
(42.32)*** (23.65)*** (38.42)*** (42.18)*** (25.31)*** (37.85)***
SMB 0.811 0.938 0.576 0.823 0.944 0.58
(20.89)*** (12.50)*** (14.39)*** (21.23)*** (13.94)*** (14.48)***
HML -0.099 -0.292 0.072 -0.09 -0.316 0.069
(2.52)** (3.83)*** (1.76)* (2.28)** (4.55)*** (1.68)*
UMD -0.239 -0.425 -0.172 -0.234 -0.432 -0.174
(8.07)*** (7.41)*** (5.59)*** (7.88)*** (8.31)*** (5.65)***
Liquidity 0.077 0.110 0.039
(2.64)*** (2.17)** (1.31)
R2 0.90 0.76 0.86 0.90 0.80 0.87
N 383 381 382 371 371 370
Panel B: Value-weighted returns
Alpha 0.036 -0.036 0.18 0.014 -0.13 0.186
(0.47) (0.28) (1.57) (0.19) (1.01) (1.58)
Risk Factors:
Rm 1.001 1.002 0.96 1.02 1.027 0.973
(57.51)*** (35.12)*** (37.58)*** (60.06)*** (36.06)*** (37.49)***
SMB -0.082 -0.114 -0.112 -0.068 -0.087 -0.106
(3.03)*** (2.58)** (2.82)*** (2.63)*** (2.00)** (2.67)***
HML -0.226 -0.416 -0.217 -0.202 -0.386 -0.200
(8.25)*** (9.27)*** (5.40)*** (7.60)*** (8.66)*** (4.92)***
UMD -0.073 -0.145 -0.157 -0.058 -0.126 -0.146
(3.55)*** (4.28)*** (5.16)*** (2.93)*** (3.77)*** (4.78)***
Liquidity 0.027 0.058 -0.007
(1.37) (1.78)* (0.23)
R2 0.92 0.82 0.83 0.93 0.83 0.83
N 383 381 382 371 371 370
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Table 13
Acquirer Post-Merger Portfolio Returns Sorted by Firm-Specific Error
The table reports the coefficient estimates from calendar time portfolio regressions. The dependent variable is the
monthly returns on portfolios of acquirers sorted by payment method and firm-specific pricing error (top vs. bottom
half). An acquirer will be in month t portfolio if it has announced the acquisition between month t-36 and t. The
explanatory variables are the Fama-French three factors and momentum. Rm is excess return on the market. SMB
is the average return on small- minus large-stock portfolios. HML is the average return on value minus growth
portfolios. UMD is the average return on up minus down portfolios. The monthly returns on acquirer portfolios are
equal-weighted in Panel A and value-weighted in panel B. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. t-statistics are in
parentheses and standard errors are robust. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
All-Stock bids All-Cash bids Long All-Cash and Low
High Pricing Low Pricing High Pricing Low Pricing Pricing Error; Short All-Stock
Error Error Error Error and High Pricing Error
Panel A: Equal-weighted returns
Alpha -0.187 -0.436 -0.074 0.148 0.328
(0.76) (1.16) (0.54) (0.78) (1.11)
Risk Factors:
Rm 1.139 1.087 0.979 1.089 -0.084
(20.79)*** (12.82)*** (32.04)*** (25.72)*** (1.27)
SMB 0.793 1.189 0.558 0.658 -0.182
(9.35)*** (9.15)*** (11.78)*** (10.11)*** (1.79)*
HML -0.422 -0.023 -0.062 0.238 0.624
(4.90)*** (0.17) (1.28) (3.55)*** (5.98)***
UMD -0.457 -0.294 -0.303 0.055 0.476
(7.04)*** (2.89)*** (8.34)*** (1.07) (6.01)***
R2 0.71 0.51 0.83 0.73 0.17
N 381 376 382 373 373
Panel B: Value-weighted returns
Alpha -0.184 -0.202 0.224 0.022 0.192
(1.19) (0.71) (1.64) (0.11) (0.76)
Risk Factors:
Rm 1.03 1.132 0.954 1.108 0.062
(29.77)*** (17.63)*** (31.32)*** (23.72)*** (1.09)
SMB -0.109 0.182 -0.126 0.048 0.118
(2.03)** (1.85)* (2.66)*** (0.67) (1.36)
HML -0.514 0.203 -0.307 0.043 0.527
(9.43)*** (2.01)** (6.40)*** (0.58) (5.88)***
UMD -0.179 0.102 -0.216 0.168 0.311
(4.37)*** (1.33) (5.96)*** (3.00)*** (4.59)***
R2 0.77 0.49 0.78 0.64 0.09
N 381 376 382 373 373
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Table 14
Instrumenting Firm-Specific Error Controlling for Industry Characteristics
The table reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the choice of all-stock merger bids vs. all-
cash/mixed bids. The explanatory variables are Firm-specific Error, industry characteristics, Sales Rank, Market
Share, and other control variables from the baseline model in Table 4. In the first three columns, the estimates are
from regular probit regressions. In the last three columns, Firm-specific Error is instrumented by price pressure from
mutual fund flows. Firm characteristics are lagged by one year. Also estimated, but not reported, is a constant term.
The sample is 3,629 merger bids for U.S. targets by U.S. public acquirers in 1980-2008. All variables are defined
in Appendix 1. Z-statistics are in parentheses, using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
Uninstrumented Regressions Instrumented Regressions
Valuation measures:
Firm-specific Error 0.122 0.158 0.162 -0.975 -1.018 -1.034
(4.71)*** (5.75)*** (5.75)*** (12.77)*** (11.17)*** (11.66)***
Industry characteristics:
Vertical Relatedness -0.843 -0.721 -0.614 -0.245 0.047 -0.073
(1.83)* (1.45) (1.21) (0.71) (0.13) (0.20)
Complementarity 0.203 0.196 0.19 0.163 0.144 0.146
(2.92)*** (2.71)*** (2.59)*** (2.80)*** (2.40)** (2.43)**
High-Tech Dummy 0.43 0.455 0.439 0.317 0.287 0.29
(9.68)*** (9.25)*** (8.74)*** (6.05)*** (4.49)*** (4.68)***
HHI -0.139 -0.319 -0.191 -0.203 -0.208 0.081
(0.45) (0.98) (0.48) (0.67) (0.67) (0.25)
Top 20% Industry Leaders -0.069 -0.091 -0.108 0.339 0.352 0.371
(1.55) (1.96)* (2.29)** (6.99)*** (6.56)*** (6.68)***
Bidder characteristics:
Sales Rank -0.466 -0.444 0.466 0.464
(5.38)*** (5.00)*** (3.72)*** (3.82)***
Market Share -2.101 -2.264 0.616 0.594
(2.31)** (2.53)** (0.90) (0.87)
Operating Efficiency -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.37) (0.23) (0.33) (0.60)
Dividend Dummy -0.303 -0.327 -0.136 -0.134
(5.86)*** (6.22)*** (2.42)** (2.26)**
Net Leverage -0.793 -0.832 -0.082 -0.107
(7.90)*** (8.06)*** (0.57) (0.72)
R&D 0.225 0.166 2.083 2.065
(0.74) (0.54) (5.96)*** (5.76)***
Asset Tangibility 0.013 0.044 -0.092 -0.054
(0.16) (0.53) (1.36) (0.79)
Macro characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.071 0.005
(4.18)*** (0.31)
Credit Spread -0.049 -0.038
(2.35)** (2.29)**
Exogeneity Tests :
Wald Statistic 32.5 21.7 21.47
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Weak Instrument Tests :
F Statistic 19.03 10.31 9.4
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
N 3629 3629 3536 3629 3629 3536
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Table 15
Geographic Location, Industry Relatedness and the All-Stock Choice
This table reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the choice of all-stock merger bids vs. all-
cash/mixed bids. The explanatory variables are Local Deal, Urban Deal, industry characteristics, and control variables
from the baseline model. Local Deal indicates that the acquirer and target are located within 30 miles. Urban Deal
indicates that the acquirer is located within 30 miles from one of the ten largest metropolitan areas. If the target or
acquirer zip code is missing in SDC, Local Deal is set to zero (columns 1-3 and 7-8) or the observation is eliminated
(columns 4-6). Vertical Relatedness and Complementarity are based on Fan and Lang (2000). High-tech Dummy
indicates that the acquirer is in a high-tech industry according to American Electronic Association. HHI is the
Herfindahl Hirschman Index. Top 20% Industry Leaders indicates that the acquirer’s total assets are in the largest
quintile in its FF49 industry. In columns 7-8, Size, Dividend, R&D, and Leverage are replaced with the components
orthogonal to industry variables (the predicted residuals). Also estimated, but not reported, is a constant term.
The sample is 4,919 merger bids for U.S. targets by U.S. public acquirers in 1980-2008. All variables are defined
in Appendix 1. Z-statistics are in parentheses, using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Rule for Missing Zip Code: Local Dummy=0 Observation is Excluded Local Dummy=0
Geographic Location:
Local Deal 0.275 0.194 0.176 0.22 0.162 0.147 0.191 0.195
(4.23)*** (2.81)*** (2.54)** (3.25)*** (2.30)** (2.05)** (2.80)*** (2.74)***
Urban Deal -0.044 -0.022 -0.027 -0.085 -0.044 -0.033 -0.001 0.021
(1.12) (0.53) (0.65) (1.66)* (0.83) (0.60) (0.03) (0.48)
Industry characteristics:
Vertical Relatedness -0.471 -0.232
(1.15) (0.52)
Complementarity 0.228 0.19
(3.67)*** (2.89)***
High-Tech Dummy 0.521 0.497
(12.83)*** (10.89)***
HHI -0.309 0.016
(1.11) (0.04)
Top 20% Industry Leaders -0.003 -0.035
(0.07) (0.85)
Bidder Characteristics:
Size -0.021 -0.024 -0.047 -0.052 -0.073
(2.17)** (2.42)** (3.55)*** (3.77)*** (5.38)***
Operating Efficiency -0.004 -0.004 0 -0.002 -0.003
(1.12) (1.30) (0.04) (0.37) (1.00)
Market to Book Equity 0.021 0.02 0.026 0.026 0.019
(4.93)*** (4.56)*** (4.43)*** (4.55)*** (4.29)***
Dividend Dummy -0.339 -0.231 -0.234 -0.162 -0.319
(7.70)*** (5.03)*** (3.98)*** (2.65)*** (6.73)***
Net Leverage -0.577 -0.483 -0.473 -0.397 -0.496
(6.73)*** (5.44)*** (4.30)*** (3.40)*** (5.52)***
R&D 1.096 0.828 0.945 0.804 0.465
(3.99)*** (2.70)*** (2.70)*** (2.03)** (1.57)
Asset Tangibility -0.07 -0.042 0.054 0.085 -0.03
(1.06) (0.52) (0.62) (0.79) (0.41)
Macro Characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.075 0.077 0.077 0.078 0.074
(5.13)*** (5.11)*** (3.99)*** (3.90)*** (4.87)***
Credit Spread -0.084 -0.078 -0.055 -0.043 -0.079
(4.63)*** (4.21)*** (2.35)** (1.77)* (4.19)***
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0 0.07 0.09 0 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.08
N 4919 4786 4766 2704 2629 2605 4567 4441
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Table 16
Estimation of Target Leverage and Target Cash
This table summarizes the results from the estimation of target leverage and target cash. The coefficients are the
time-series averages of the annual leverage and cash regressions. N is the average number of observations in the annual
regressions. The dependent variable is market leverage, book leverage, and cash ratios, respectively. Explanatory
variables are firm characteristics lagged by one year. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Numbers in the
parentheses are the t-statistics from the tests whether the time-series average is equal to zero. The *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Market Leverage Book Leverage Cash
Bidder Characteristics:
Size 0.0077 -0.0015 -0.0117
(12.71)*** (1.05) (15.48)***
Operating Efficiency 0.0018 0.0003 -0.0002
(4.14)*** (0.73) (1.31)
Market to Book Equity -0.0062 -0.0028 0.0009
(19.65)*** (6.41)*** (7.7)***
R&D -0.2129 0.0276 0.1976
(10.39)*** (1.02) (9.36)***
Missing R&D Dummy 0.0462 0.0413 -0.0045
(16.04)*** (9.94)*** (2.84)***
Asset Tangibility 0.0782 0.1066 -0.0408
(15.59)*** (18.20)*** (11.31)***
Leverage -0.06
(11.2)***
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 4103 4142 4076
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Table 17
Decomposition of Leverage and Cash, SEOs, and the All-Stock Choice
The table reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the choice of all-stock vs. all-cash/mixed bids.
The explanatory variables are capital structure characteristics, Large Deal Dummy, and control variables from the
baseline model in Table 4. In the first four columns, Leverage is market leverage. In the last four columns, Leverage
is book leverage. Deviation from Target Leverage is based on Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) and the estimated
coefficients are shown in Table 16. Stock Issue Dummy indicates that the acquirer does an SEO in year of (t), or
the year prior to (t − 1), the merger. Large Deal Dummy indicates that the ratio of deal value to acquirer total
assets is in the top quartile. Firm characteristics are lagged by one year. Also estimated, but not reported, is a
constant term. The sample is 4,708 merger bids for U.S. targets by U.S. public acquirers in 1980-2008. All variables
are defined in Appendix 1. Z-statistics are in parentheses, using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Market Leverage Book Leverage
Capital structure characteristics:
Leverage -1.326 -1.32 -1.497 -1.621 -0.563 -0.685 -0.793 -0.887
(9.34)*** (8.97)*** (9.78)*** (10.09)*** (3.90)*** (4.36)*** (4.71)*** (5.00)***
Deviation from Target Leverage 1.191 1.133 1.404 1.48 0.43 0.472 0.637 0.748
(5.44)*** (5.17)*** (6.20)*** (6.33)*** (1.89)* (1.97)** (2.38)** (2.74)***
Cash Holding 2.568 0.859 0.459 -0.831 3.51 1.701 1.422 0.007
(8.24)*** (1.98)** (1.02) (1.51) (11.82)*** (3.98)*** (3.20)*** (0.01)
Excess Cash -2.079 -0.497 -0.137 1.143 -2.825 -1.163 -0.914 0.502
(6.04)*** (1.12) (0.30) (2.06)** (8.52)*** (2.67)*** (2.02)** (0.92)
Stock Issue Dummyt 0.138 0.122 0.093 0.153 0.145 0.122
(2.30)** (2.00)** (1.50) (2.58)*** (2.39)** (1.98)**
Stock Issue Dummyt−1 0.314 0.309 0.274 0.331 0.327 0.289
(5.10)*** (4.95)*** (4.32)*** (5.43)*** (5.31)*** (4.62)***
Deal characteristics:
Large Deal Dummy 0.306 0.264 0.285 0.288 0.251 0.268
(6.12)*** (5.13)*** (5.44)*** (5.78)*** (4.90)*** (5.14)***
Bidder characteristics:
Size -0.009 -0.02 -0.031 -0.003 -0.012 -0.026
(0.94) (1.86)* (2.78)*** (0.28) (1.12) (2.33)**
Operating Efficiency -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.59) (0.72) (1.03) (0.77) (0.95) (1.17)
Market to Book Equity 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.022 0.023 0.023
(3.86)*** (4.03)*** (3.80)*** (4.87)*** (5.04)*** (4.95)***
Dividend Dummy -0.264 -0.281 -0.205 -0.261 -0.277 -0.208
(5.63)*** (5.88)*** (4.22)*** (5.62)*** (5.88)*** (4.33)***
R&D 0.774 0.777 1.015 0.852 0.857 1.027
(2.49)** (2.39)** (2.84)*** (2.68)*** (2.58)*** (2.84)***
Asset Tangibility -0.039 -0.023 -0.091 -0.01 0.01 -0.058
(0.56) (0.33) (1.02) (0.15) (0.14) (0.66)
Macro characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.068 0.073 0.066 0.073
(4.41)*** (4.59)*** (4.35)*** (4.64)***
Credit Spread -0.079 -0.075 -0.06 -0.056
(4.12)*** (3.78)*** (3.17)*** (2.87)***
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.09 0.1 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.1
N 4699 4699 4572 4552 4708 4708 4581 4561
49
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions
Variable name Source Variable definition
A. Deal characteristics
All-Stock Bid SDC Consideration structure is SHARES
All-Cash Bid SDC Consideration structure is CASHO
Mixed Offer SDC Consideration structure is HYBRID or OTHER
Completed Deal SDC Deal Status in SDC is equal to “Completed”
Public Target SDC Target Public Status is “Public”
Target Premium SDC Offered price in percent of target stock price four weeks prior to deal announcement
B. Bidder characteristics
Size Compustat Natural Log of Total Assets
Operating Efficiency Compustat (Cost of Goods Sold + Expense)/Net Operating Assets, Net Operating Assets=Properties, Plants and
Equipment + Total Current Assets - Cash -Total Current Liabilities
Dividend Dummy Compustat A dummy taking the value of 1 if total dividends are greater than 0
R&D Compustat R&D Expense/Total Assets
Asset Tangibility Compustat Properties, Plants and Equipment/ Total Assets
C. Firm valuation
Market to Book Equity Compustat (Closing Price x Number of Shares Outstanding)/ (Total Assets - Total Liabilities)
Firm-specific Error Authors’ Calculation Based on Rhodes Kropf, Robinson, and Visvanathan (2005), Firm-specific Error=Market Value -
Fundamental Value Based on Sector Pricing Rule in year t; Fundamental Value Based on Industry
Pricing Rule in year t is the fitted firm market value from the regression: Market value = β0 + β1
(Book Value) + β2 (Operating Cash Flow) + β3 (Net Leverage) + e where β’s are estimated from all
Compustat firms in the same FF16 industries in year t.
Time-Series Sector Error Authors’ Calculation Based on Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), Time-Series Sector Error = Fundamental
Value Based on Sector Pricing Rule in year t - Fundamental Value Based on Long-Run Sector Pricing
Rule; Fundamental Value Based on Long-Run Industry Pricing Rule is the firm market value from the
following equation: Market value = average β0 + average β1 (Book Value) + average β2 (Operating
Cash Flow) + average β3 (Net Leverage) where average β’s are the long-run averages of β’s across all
years.
Long-Run Value to Book Authors’ Calculation Based on Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), Long-Run Value to Book = Fundamental
Value Based on Long-Run Industry Pricing Rule - Book Value
Edmans et. al’s Discount Authors’ Calculation Based on Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), Potential Value is the fitted firm market value from
the quantile regression: Market Value = β0 + β1 (Book Value) + β2 (Operating Cash Flow) + β3
(Net Leverage) + e. We choose (1-α) equal to 0.20. The discount is defined as (Potential Value -
Market Value)/Potential Value.
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Appendix 1 continued from previous page
Variable name Source Variable definition
D. Macro and market timing variables
Industry Wave Authors’ Calculation Based on Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang (2012), we calculate the aggregate volume of mergers scaled
by aggregate total assets of Compustat firms in each FF49 industry each year. Then, we calculate the
mean and standard deviation of merger-to-total assets across all years. Industry Wave is defined as
the z-score ((Aggregate Mergers-to-Total Assets in year t - Long-Run Mean)/Standard Deviation).
Credit Spread Federal Reserve’s Web-
site
Moody’s yield on AAA seasoned corporate bonds - 3-month treasury bill (secondary market rate)
Sentiment Jeffrey Wurgler’s Web-
site
Sentiment index in Baker and Wurgler (2006) based on first principal component of six sentiment prox-
ies where each of the proxies has first been orthogonalized with respect to macroeconomic conditions
Mutual Fund Flow Authors’ Calculation Based on Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), we compute mutual fund price pressure from Thomson
Reuters mutual fund holdings database. Mutual fund price pressure is defined as the product of total
flows experienced by each fund and shares of each stock as a proportion of fund’s total assets.
E: Industry characteristics
Vertical Relatedness Joseph Fan’s Website Based on Fan and Lang (2000), the variable captures how much input/output of acquirer industry is
bought and sold to target industry.
Complementarity Joseph Fan’s Website Based on Fan and Lang (2000), the variable captures how much acquirer industry and target industry
share the same input/output.
High Tech Dummy American Electronic
Association
A dummy taking the value of 1 if the firm’s 4-digit SIC is in High-Tech industry according to America
Electronic Association
Top 20% Industry Leaders Authors’ Calculation A dummy taking the value of 1 if the firm is among Compustat’s 20% largest firms (based on Total
Assets) in its FF49 Industry
HHI Authors’ Calculation Herfindahl Hirschman Index calculated by total assets of Compustat firms for each FF49 Industry
Industry Fixed Effects Kenneth French’s Web-
site
Industry dummies defined by FF49 industries
F: Geographic location
Local Deal (30 miles) Authors’ Calculation A dummy taking the value of 1 if the acquirer and target are located within 30 miles from
each other, The data on firm location are from the ZIP codes in SDC. The distance be-
tween acquirers and targets is computed using the spherical law of cosines formula: Distance =
arccos(sin(lat1).sin(lat2)+cos(lat1).cos(lat2).cos(long2-long1)).R where R = Radius of the Earth =
3963 miles (lat1,long1)= coordinate (latitude,longtitude) of the acquirer in radians (lat2,long2)= co-
ordinate of the target in radians, Coordinates (lat,long) of all the zip codes are from 1987 U.S. Census
Gazetteer Files.
Urban Acquirer Authors’ Calculation A dummy taking the value of 1 if a firm is located within 30 miles from one of the ten largest metropoli-
tan areas - New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington DC, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston,
Detroit, Dallas, and Houston Coordinates of the city centers are from www.world-gazetteer.com.
G. Capital structure variables
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Appendix 1 continued from previous page
Variable name Source Variable definition
Net Leverage Compustat (Total Debts- Cash)/Total Assets
Book Leverage Compustat Total Debts/Total Assets
Market Leverage Compustat Total Debts/ (Market Value of Equity + Total Debts), Market Value of Equity = Closing Price x
Number of Shares Outstanding
Deviation from Target
Leverage
Authors’ Calculation Based on Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009), Deviation from Target Leverage is the fitted residuals
from the following cross-sectional (year-by-year) regression: Leverage = β0 + β1 (Size) + β2 (Operating
Efficiency)+ β3 (Market to Book Equity) + β4 (R&D) + β5 (Missing R&D Dummy) + Industry Fixed
Effects + e. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Cash Holding Compustat Cash/Total Assets
Excess Cash Authors’ Calculation Excess Cash is the fitted residuals from the following cross-sectional (year-by-year) regression: Cash
Holding = β0 + β1 (Size) + β2 (Operating Efficiency)+ β3 (Market to Book Equity) + β4 (R&D) +
β5 (Missing R&D Dummy) + β6 (Leverage) + Industry Fixed Effects + e. All explanatory variables
are lagged by one year.
Large Deal Dummy SDC A dummy taking the value of 1 if Relative Size (Deal Value/Total Assets) is in the top quartile
Stock Issue Dummy SDC A dummy taking the value of 1 if the acquirer issues stock in the year of merger (t) or the prior year
(t− 1)
H. Bidder returns and risk factors
Announcement Return Authors’ Calculation Abnormal returns are estimated from a standard market model: Ri = a + b Rm +e. We use CRSPs
daily holding period returns (dividends included) for Ri. Following Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn
(2008), we use [-291: -42] as the estimation window, [-41; -2] as the exclusion period due to run-ups,
and [-1; 1] as the event window. Event date is the announcement date on SDC.
Calendar Time Portfolio
Return
Authors’ Calculation Monthly returns on portfolios of acquirers, pure-stock acquirers, and pure-cash acquirers An acquirer
will be in month t portfolio if it has announced the acquisition between month t-36 and t.
Alpha Authors’ Calculation Jensen’s alpha calculated from regressing Calendar Time Portfolio returns on Fama-French 3 factors
and Fama-French 3 factors with Liquidity
Rm CRSP Excess return on the market = the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks
(from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate
SMB CRSP SMB (Small Minus Big) is the return on the small portfolios minus the average return on big portfolios
HML CRSP HML(High Minus Low) is the return on the value portfolios minus the average return on growth
portfolios
UMD CRSP Momentum (UMD) is the return on the up portfolios minus the average return on down portfolios
Liquidity CRSP Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s traded liquidity factor
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